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ABSTRACT 
Current intelligence activities conducted by law enforcement agencies in the United 
States are primarily limited to criminal investigations. This is a problem because as the 
9/11 commission recognized, the fight against terrorism requires a greater focus on 
domestic intelligence and greater coordination between national, local, state and tribal 
agencies. Existing guidance and laws create an environment in which state and local law 
enforcement agencies have limited knowledge on how to navigate and participate in the 
broader national intelligence and homeland security effort. The research question posed 
is, How can state police agencies, in conjunction with Department of Homeland Security 
recognized state level fusion centers, establish field intelligence operational doctrine to 
develop or enhance existing police intelligence operations while bridging the gap 
between federal intelligence community partners and local stakeholders? Establishing a 
formal doctrine on domestic law enforcement intelligence will bridge the gap of 
information and intelligence flow in the intelligence cycle by defining methods, 
strategies, field craft and ethos. Case studies were reviewed, and it was determined that 
blending practices from the U.S. military, the United Kingdom and current law 
enforcement strategies, will begin the establishment of doctrine and dismantle barriers 
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Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other national 
intelligence community (IC) agencies have some domestic intelligence responsibilities, 
intelligence activities conducted by law enforcement agencies in the United States are 
primarily limited to criminal investigations.1  This is a problem because as the 9/11 
commission recognized, the fight against terrorism requires a greater focus on domestic 
intelligence and greater coordination between national and local agencies.2  Existing 
guidance, including the U.S. Attorney General’s (A.G.) Guidelines/Opinions,3 as well as 
federal law guiding intelligence collection, such as 28CFR Part 23, create an environment 
in which state and local law enforcement agencies have limited knowledge on how to 
navigate and participate in the broader national intelligence and homeland security 
effort.4     
Domestic intelligence activities have been criticized based upon past abuse and a 
lack of transparency on what is collected and why.5  As a result, many police departments 
appear to be reluctant to formulate intelligence doctrine, and instead have established 
only a basic intelligence collection process that emphasizes liaison with other agencies 
and information sharing. Developing a doctrine that not only defines and clarifies 
domestic intelligence, but also lays a road map to sound steps of success, could begin the 
1 M. A. Randol, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches 
DIANE Publishing. 2010.  
2 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011).  
3 United States Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines For Domestic FBI Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: Department Of Justice, 2005). 
4 David L. Carter, Implement Intelligence-Led Policing in State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies: Considerations and Processes (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 2007).  
5 Respect To Intelligence Activities, “Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,” Book II, 
U.S.  
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momentum forward to bridging a gap in information flow that the state police and fusion 
centers will be able to use in order to be proactive in identifying threats. 
This thesis argues that state police agencies tasked with fusion center operations 
should establish a domestic intelligence doctrine that leverages the established policing 
models of intelligence-led policing, community oriented policing and problem oriented 
policing to most effectively conduct domestic intelligence operations. Currently, most 
state and local fusion centers operate as a collection, filter and analyzing entity, and they 
do not have enforcement or direct field collection requirements.6  The need to establish 
field domestic intelligence doctrines that are in line with fusion center strategy, as 
prescribed by DHS, 7  could bridge the gap of intelligence cycle failures. The field 
intelligence operations working on a common doctrinal platform could create an 
intelligence collection cycle that will become more efficient and effective as guidance 
and direction is clearly defined and prescribed. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can state police agencies, in conjunction with DHS recognized state level 
fusion centers, establish field intelligence operational doctrine to develop or enhance 
existing police intelligence operations while bridging the gap between federal intelligence 
community partners and local stakeholders? Secondary questions at a micro level are: 
What barriers exist between state level fusion centers, the local police stakeholders, and 
the federal intelligence community? How can these barriers be reduced or eliminated?   
METHOD 
The unit of study will be the comparisons of doctrines from the United States 
(U.S.) government (Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS, DoD, U.S. Forest 
Service), the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence strategy/doctrine of CONTEST 
(acronym used meaning Counter Terrorism Strategy), and current domestic law 
enforcement criminal intelligence/police strategies. The analysis will be to define the 
6 John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Report RL34070  (Washington, 
D.C.: Library of Congress, Research Service, July 6, 2008). 
7 Law Enforcement Intelligence. “Fusion Center Guidelines.” 
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types of doctrine, compare the doctrines and see if current LE strategies and models 
could or should be enhanced with a blended doctrine from the case studies. By seeing 
what is successful in each doctrine (currently success in LE is on crime reduction) and 
conducting a synthesized approach to comparison, the thesis will explore the idea that 
parts of each doctrine could be adopted into state and local law enforcement models. 
Analysis will show a need for the law enforcement community in the U.S. to begin the 
dialogue of the need to codify established/existing policy, methodology, strategies and 
themes and fusing those as a working doctrine. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
An abundance of literature is available on the topic of intelligence-led policing. 
The literature ranges from theoretical models to practical recommendations for how local 
agencies can implement intelligence programs. But, while the literature was clear on the 
history, methodology, model policies and case studies, there was a lack of literature 
examining how state police organizations in the United States have conducted 
intelligence operations and served as the conduit between the federal government and the 
local law enforcement departments.  
The subcomponents of the literature on this topic can be identified as: Model 
Policy, Theoretical Perspectives, Case Studies, Intelligence Collection Cycle, Community 
Perspectives and other similar but slightly different angles. One important finding is that 
intelligence-led policing (ILP) has different definitions and different levels of inclusion 
depending on the agency involved. A note should also be presented that current literature 
reviews on problem oriented and community oriented policing, as a domestic intelligence 
strategy was very limited. The thesis topic of state police entities with fusion center 
responsibility conducting domestic intelligence operations under a specific doctrine is 
under represented in the literature. The thesis will look specifically for state police-led 
domestic intelligence operations that transcend the local/federal membrane and perceived 
glass ceilings.  
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Currently, articles specifically give New York state police, New Jersey state 
police, and state regional centers the majority of review specifically to how state police 
agencies are using ILP for day-to-day operations. The literature does not appear to 
include specific information to state lead domestic intelligence collection initiatives, 
except for examples like the Massachusetts state police using Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) data and field groups to reduce gun violence and other similar case studies on 
UCR data and response to that information to shift police deployment. There is also very 
little data conducting a comparison analysis on the three law enforcement strategies and 
which one is better for domestic intelligence doctrine development.   
The literature on doctrine was sparse and singular in nature (DoD/U.S. 
government), while that on intelligence-led policing is very factual, peer reviewed, 
accepted and abundant. There is a specific gap of literature that explains the state police 
role in intelligence operations for federal agencies and back down to the local LEA’s 
operations to reduce crime. The gap remains on how to bridge federal intelligence needs 
and local needs while maintaining public support, and legal requirements. The research 
focuses on this gap and establishes a means to incorporate the academia framework with 
field relevant operations to establish a smart practice using doctrine as the guiding 
principle. This framework, blended with defined output/outcome measures, should allow 
a reader to establish a scale of success in the intelligence cycle. Establishing a doctrine 
without dogmatic restrictions of fear of change or lack of change with pure authoritative 
unchallengeable principles, and embracing pragmatic qualities that are dictated by 
practical consequences and lessons learned from actual occurrences, will be further 
reviewed by fusing of the case studies presented. 
CASE STUDIES 
Chapter III will begin the case studies using U.S. law enforcement strategies, the 
U.K. Counter Terror Strategy of CONTEST, as well as a third case study of U.S. 
government doctrines in use. As the case studies are presented, a historical context will 
be presented. As the case studies are from foreign governments, as well as the DoD, legal 
aspects will be presented, as the need to make example cases fit into the U.S. system of 
 xiv 
government for domestic police work will be important. Each case study will be analyzed 
on how it fits into a law enforcement domestic intelligence doctrine. The first case study 
has three strategies and after the three are explained, the legal aspects and analysis for 
that study will be explored. The second case study will be defined as a single unit, and 
then the legal aspects, as well as how or where it fits will be presented. The third case 
study has three examples of doctrine in use, and as they are legally operating in the 
current systems, an analysis of how it fits will be the main points of the case study. 
U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT DOMESTIC STRATEGIES 
Current United States law enforcement policies, methods, strategies and 
guidelines that are used by each individual police department are usually dependent upon 
the chief executive (Chief, Director, etc.) of the individual agency. This autonomous 
nature of policing in the U.S. is geographically jurisdictional in nature and each 
community usually demands and drives the political climate in order to influence the type 
of policing strategy that may be implemented. These same agencies need to conduct 
research to develop appropriate tactics, which is based upon a needs assessment, usually 
in the form of an analysis of crime rates specifically to Part 1 Uniform Crime Report 
categories. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the following definitions in 
Appendix II of their crime reporting manual. 
The UCR Program collects data about Part I offenses in order to measure 
the level and scope of crime occurring throughout the Nation. The 
Program’s founders chose these offenses because they are serious crimes, 
they occur with regularity in all areas of the country, and they are likely to 
be reported to police. The Part I offenses are: 
Criminal homicide ―Forcible rape ―Robbery ―Aggravated assault 
―Burglary (breaking or entering) ―Larceny-theft (except motor 
vehicle theft) ―Motor vehicle theft ―Arson ― 
The goals of law enforcement agencies are to reduce the crime rate, protect 
citizens and property, and engage the community to reduce fear. Literature, publications 
and academia recognize the top three strategies in U.S. law enforcement (LE) as problem 
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oriented policing (POP), 8  intelligence-led policing (ILP) 9 , and community oriented 
policing (COP).10 With the exception of POP, most U.S. strategies have actually been 
retooled from the British policing models over the years. A sampling of agencies across 
the U.S. would likely show a hybrid approach using parts of all three, as a single set 
strategy does not always have the exact answer to a diverse communities’ crime problem. 
A blend of POP and COP has been a dominant fixture in U.S. law enforcement culture. 
Recently, an upswing in the strategy of ILP has been renewed. This section will give a 
brief history and methodology to the three types of strategies in order to begin the 
discourse on the LE domestic intelligence enterprise. Without understanding the culture 
of LE methods and history, the current ILP strategy and future ILP doctrine would not be 
scoped properly. An analysis on the missing doctrine in the current LE enterprise will 
begin the gap analysis for further review and research. 
UNITED KINGDOM COUNTER TERROR DOCTRINE 
The United Kingdom has created a program called CONTEST,11 which is their 
main counter terror strategy. CONTEST will be explored in this case study to be a 
comparative model from another country with a long history of combating terrorism 
domestically. We will explore the basic tenants of CONTEST, look at legal aspects on 
how the British use this concept, and how it may or may not fit in the U.S. with our legal 
restrictions and then do a comparison of strategies under an analysis section. 
The four methods of implementing the CONTEST strategy rely upon the ability to 
pursue, prevent, protect and prepare. According to the CONTEST publication, pursue is 
defined by stopping terror attacks, prevent is anti-radicalization efforts, protect is to 
strengthen targets and prepare is to mitigate the impact. Pursue is defined specifically as 
8 Center for Problem Oriented Policing. University of Wisconsin, accessed July 29, 2013, 
www.popcenter.org.  
9 D. L. Carter, and J. G. Carter, “Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations 
for Public Policy.” Criminal Justice Policy Review. 20, no. 3. 2009: 310–325.  
10 Lorie Fridell, and Ann Wycoff, Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future (Washington, 
D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2004).  
11 Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (England: 
Great Britain, 2011).  
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“stop terrorist attacks…by detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible 
stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and whenever 
possible, prosecuting those responsible.” Prevent is defined as “not just arresting and 
prosecuting terrorist…. but addressing radicalization to all forms of terrorism.”  Protect is 
defined as “strengthen protection against a terrorist attack…and reduce vulnerability.” 
The protect strategy includes Border Security. Prepare is defined as “work to mitigate the 
impact of a terror attack….including bringing a terror attack to an end as well as being 
more resilient.”12 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES OF DOCTRINE 
Introduction to General Doctrine 
DoD Joint Publication1-2, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms:13 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements there of 
guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but 
requires judgment in application.  
Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 
Something that is taught, a principle or position or the body of principles 
in a branch of knowledge or system of belief, a statement of fundamental 
government policy especially in international relations, a military principle 
or set of strategies. 
When defining doctrine, the pre-eminent source of reading and modeling is from 
the armed forces. In the current DoD framework, they have established joint 
publications14 as a formal doctrine that each service will be guided by when working in 
nonsingular tactical operations. FEMA has also published Publication 115 in 2010 that 
serves as “a capstone doctrine…. that defines our principals and culture, describes our 
12 Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (England: 
Great Britain, 2011).  
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms.  
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States. 
15 FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1, 2010.  
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history, mission, purpose, and ethos.”  The Fire Service under the leadership of the U.S. 
Forest Service has a core doctrine in its publication “Wildland Fire Suppression: 
Foundational Doctrine.”16  There are other examples of doctrine based upon court or 
case precedence known as legal doctrine, principles that are given a name of the author 
such as the Monroe Doctrine, Bush Doctrine etc., and religious doctrine depending upon 
the faith. There is a glaring example of doctrine when we look at the U.S. Constitution in 
the definitional framework as above and believe it is the core set of beliefs that lay a 
principle to guide our decisions in how we operate a complex adaptive system called the 
United States. 
SO WHAT?  WHY DO WE NEED A DOCTRINE? 
The current components of law enforcement (LE) intelligence gathering rely on 
standards of LE established through the lens of the criminal justice framework.17 The 
basis for the current components of the collection of criminal intelligence lay in the 
legality, privacy of information, citizen protections (court orders) and general acceptance 
of the tradecraft. The current model used is an ad-hoc collection of proposed guidelines, 
strategies and methods that are not codified in a formal document. 18  This ad-hoc 
approach to leveraging the strategy of intelligence-led policing creates a lack of 
comprehensive, clear and repeatable metrics across the U.S. police enterprise. Currently 
in LE, departments are conducting a mash up of intelligence-led, community oriented and 
problem oriented policing19 with the only accountable metric being UCR data reduction 
primarily in the Part I crime index. Codifying a formal template with multiple strategies 
can and would create the doctrine needed to begin the baseline achievements of 
information and intelligence sharing. By establishing the doctrine, organizations can 
evaluate where they are and how this will affect their individual operations. It will also 
16  Edward D. Hollenshead et al., Fire Suppression: Foundational Doctrine (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, 2005).  
17 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management 
for Law Enforcement Leaders.” (2007). 
18  Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problems of Turning Rhetoric into Practice: 53–66.  
19  Carter and Carter, Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public 
Policy: 310–325.  
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allow agencies to identify common platforms, such as N-DEX and the Global Justice 
Exchange system in order to develop true sharing capability that is more efficient and 
effective in actual exchanges.20   
Having common language, common platforms and common tradecraft would 
allow transparency and public relations to increase. In summation, a Domestic 
Intelligence Doctrine would have and create new organizational implications, create 
new collection and sharing platforms, create commonality, and put the public at ease. 
The doctrine of domestic intelligence should do the following in order to be 
accepted and successful in a new paradigm shift.  
1. Eliminate 
a. Fear among the populace of a “big brother” being all knowing 
b. Misunderstandings of why intelligence is needed and what it is 
2. Reduce 
a. Failures/weak signal interpretations  
b. Concerns about privacy rights by having transparent 
methodologies 
3. Raise 
a. Awareness of privacy processes and protections that will be in 
place 
b. Protections in the forms of law and policy concerning LE actions 
4. Create  
a. A baseline doctrine of Domestic Intelligence 
b. Comprehensive model of intelligence thinking versus case specific  
c. Community input (methods/practices) for acceptance 
20  U.S. Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Navigating Your 
Agency’s Path to Intelligence-Led Policing.  
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CONCLUSION 
Doctrine has merits in some institutions and in others there may be debate on the 
effectiveness of detailed doctrine (dogma-v-innovation). The research presented showed 
that a foreign strategy, current LE strategy, as well as military strategy, all have common 
threads to be successful. Those threads are built upon a foundation that can be trusted, 
transparent, and sound. A government by the people for the people should not be against 
the people. The people however trust that their government knows how to handle tough 
situations, as well as how to handle the constitutionally protected rights we were founded 
upon. Policies, methods and strategies should always be shifting based upon educated and 
processed informational decisions by leadership of this country all the way down to the 
local first responder on the watch. Doctrinal philosophy of doing what is right when no 





I. PROBLEM SPACE  
Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other national 
intelligence community (IC) agencies have some domestic intelligence responsibilities, 
intelligence activities conducted by law enforcement agencies in the United States are 
primarily limited to criminal investigations.1  This is a problem because as the 9/11 
commission recognized, the fight against terrorism requires a greater focus on domestic 
intelligence and greater coordination between national and local agencies.2   Existing 
guidance, including the U.S. Attorney General’s (A.G.) Guidelines/Opinions,3 as well as 
federal law guiding intelligence collection, such as 28CFR Part 23, create an environment 
in which state and local law enforcement agencies have limited knowledge on how to 
navigate and participate in the broader national intelligence and homeland security 
effort.4     
There is guidance available for state and local agencies concerning intelligence 
and counterterrorism, but it is insufficient. Currently, the Department of Justice has 
publications in the form of guidelines for law enforcement intelligence, model policies5 
for criminal intelligence operations, and information sharing plans; 6 the apparent missing 
piece is a basic domestic intelligence doctrine outlining what is and is not domestic 
1  M. A. Randol, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches 
(DIANE Publishing, 2010).  
2  Thomas Kean, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011).  
3  United States Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines For Domestic FBI Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: Department Of Justice, 2005).  
4  David L. Carter, Implement Intelligence-Led Policing in State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies: Considerations and Processes (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 2007).  
5  David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies, (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
Washington, D.C., 2004).  
6  Department of Homeland Security, DHS Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2013).  
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intelligence and how to establish a sound domestic intelligence operational capability that 
bridges the gaps between local law enforcement and the federal government.  
Domestic intelligence activities have been criticized based upon past abuse and a 
lack of transparency on what is collected and why.7  As a result, many police departments 
appear to be reluctant to formulate intelligence doctrine, and instead have established 
only a basic intelligence collection process that emphasizes liaison with other agencies 
and information sharing. Developing a doctrine that not only defines and clarifies 
domestic intelligence, but also lays a road map to sound steps of success, could begin the 
momentum forward to bridging a gap in information flow that the state police and fusion 
centers will be able to use in order to be proactive in identifying threats. 
This thesis argues that state police agencies tasked with fusion center operations 
should establish a domestic intelligence doctrine that leverages the established policing 
models of intelligence-led policing, community oriented policing and problem oriented 
policing to most effectively conduct domestic intelligence operations. Currently, most 
state and local fusion centers operate as a collection, filter and analyzing entity, and they 
do not have enforcement or direct field collection requirements.8  The need to establish 
field domestic intelligence doctrines that are in line with fusion center strategy, as 
prescribed by DHS, 9  could bridge the gap of intelligence cycle failures. The field 
intelligence operations working on a common doctrinal platform could create an 
intelligence collection cycle that will become more efficient and effective as guidance 
and direction is clearly defined and prescribed. 
State and local police officers are the ground level sensors and collectors in the 
intelligence cycle. Leveraging the intelligence collectors of many agencies produces a 
crowd source of information across a wide spectrum of the population. Developing a state 
level domestic intelligence doctrine, which allows the flow of information regionally, 
7  Respect To Intelligence Activities, “Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,” Book II, 
U.S.  
8 Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress.  
9 Law Enforcement Intelligence, “Fusion Center Guidelines.” 
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could begin the filtering of information in the intelligence cycle as a national movement, 
one that is grass roots at the local level, versus a federalist top down directive from the 
U.S. government. Timely information exchange to the analysis and flow back to the 
collector is key in the disruption cycle of terrorist and organized threat elements. This 
begins the foundational motto of “Homeland Security starts with Hometown Security,” as 
is memorialized in the DHS intelligence enterprise and the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police.10 
Prevention and mitigation of terror and criminal events are the primary goals of 
state and local police in their communities. Creating a bridge between the formal federal 
intelligence community and local law enforcement is worthy of great introspection by 
citizens and law enforcement. Developing key models, strategies, and doctrine with 
appropriate safeguards requires a review of history, the blending of smart practices from 
across the world, modeling from the military along with federal law enforcement, and 
mapping the awareness of law enforcements knowledge of intelligence and the 
intelligence cycle. Accomplishing that task is the goal of this thesis.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can state police agencies, in conjunction with Department of Homeland 
Security recognized state level fusion centers, establish field intelligence operational 
doctrine to develop or enhance existing police intelligence operations while bridging the 
gap between federal intelligence community partners and local stakeholders? Secondary 
questions at a micro level are: What barriers exist between state level fusion centers, the 
local police stakeholders, and the federal intelligence community? How can these barriers 
be reduced or eliminated?   
10 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: 




                                                 
B. METHOD 
The unit of study will be the comparisons of doctrines from the United States 
(U.S.) government (Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS, DoD, U.S. Forest 
Service), the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence strategy/doctrine of CONTEST 
(acronym used meaning Counter Terrorism Strategy), and current domestic law 
enforcement criminal intelligence/police strategies. 
The case studies will be derived from a comparative analysis between a foreign 
agency domestic intelligence strategy, U.S. government established doctrines and U.S. 
law enforcement strategies. By establishing a baseline comparison, as well as a needs 
assessment, the gap should begin to come into focus. Literature reviews show policy, 
strategies and some comparative analysis, but there is no formal law enforcement 
intelligence doctrine outlining the ability to have a flow of needed information and 
intelligence. 
Additional research collection is from government reports and private entity 
analysis from companies such as RAND. The authors experience with more than six 
years in the U.S. military with combat service in OIF III conducting Counter Insurgency 
(COIN) operations in Al Anbar, Iraq and twenty years of law enforcement experience at 
the state police level with command experience in organized crime intelligence and 
investigative operations; gives the author first hand knowledge on interactions, 
operations, strategy development, criminal intelligence and experience within the joint 
operations. 
By conducting a case study analysis comparing Britain’s domestic intelligence 
doctrine of CONTEST (Currently listed as a U.K. strategy) with a sampling of U.S. 
government doctrines and U.S. law enforcement strategy models of criminal intelligence 
collection, a picture of established doctrines could be used as a baseline comparison 
model. This will determine if a state police agency and the state fusion center could adopt 
the fundamental processes, policies and operations of the case study examples to expand 
the role and fill the intelligence gap at the local and state level. 
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The first case study defines and explains the current law enforcement (LE) 
strategies/models in order to fully explain the gaps associated with criminal justice 
specific crime reduction strategies that are not in line with pure domestic intelligence 
requirements and needs. The second study will be a review of Great Britain’s domestic 
intelligence operations using their strategy CONTEST. CONTEST gives an example 
from a pure government domestic intelligence operational guideline that establishes 
priorities and explanations. The third case study will be a brief history and explanation of 
U.S. government doctrines in use. A final recommendation will be presented to enhance 
the established LE models with an intelligence doctrine to supplement the proactive 
nature of the LE models. 
The analysis will be to define the types of doctrine, compare the doctrines and see 
if current LE strategies and models could or should be enhanced with a blended doctrine 
from the case studies. By seeing what is successful in each doctrine (currently success in 
LE is on crime reduction) and conducting a synthesized approach to comparison, the 
thesis will explore the idea that parts of each doctrine could be adopted into state and 
local law enforcement models. Analysis will show a need for the law enforcement 
community in the U.S. to begin the dialogue of the need to codify established/existing 
policy, methodology, strategies and themes and fusing those as a working doctrine. 
Foreign domestic intelligence doctrine is important to study and review, as it is 
directly opposite of what the U.S. currently has. A dedicated intelligence agency that is 
not dual purposed as law enforcement and intelligence may give in-sight to the 
importance of principled approaches to create synergistic exchanges of information and 
intelligence. United States government doctrine will show how many different 
departments and agencies (each branch of DoD for example) can operate independent of 
each other to accomplish the assigned tasks, but operate on a single doctrine in which all 
components are clearly lined out and interchangeable. 
The current U.S. law enforcement models of intelligence-led policing, community 
oriented policing and problem oriented policing will be important to show the disparate 
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models, lack of interchange with the U.S. federal intelligence model and establish what 
the gaps are from the largest group of collectors of information. 
The differences in doctrine, strategies, methodology and models will be explained 
in terms of hierarchy. An example of hierarchy definitions and guidance could be shown 
as—an operation is made of techniques to accomplish a mission, which is part of a 
method of implementation that is part of a larger strategy guided by a doctrine. 
The doctrines/strategies are similar in that they have a definition, scope, 
authorizations, limitations and history. The differences are specifically related to level of 
intrusion, privacy laws, role assignments (collector versus analyst) and mission 
requirements. Law enforcement intelligence is designed to establish links for prosecution. 
Military intelligence is to give information for decision makers, domestic intelligence is 
to find and monitor activities looking for potential threats. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
An abundance of literature is available on the topic of intelligence-led policing. 
The literature ranges from theoretical models to practical recommendations for how local 
agencies can implement intelligence programs. But, while the literature was clear on the 
history, methodology, model policies and case studies, there was a lack of literature 
examining how state police organizations in the United States have conducted domestic 
intelligence operations and served as the conduit between the federal government 
intelligence community and the local law enforcement departments.  
The subcomponents of the literature on this topic can be identified as: Model 
Policy, Theoretical Perspectives, Case Studies, Intelligence Collection Cycle, Community 
Perspectives and other similar but slightly different angles. One important finding is that 
intelligence-led policing (ILP) has different definitions and different levels of inclusion 
depending on the agency involved. A note should also be presented that current literature 
reviews on problem oriented and community oriented policing as a domestic intelligence 
strategy was very limited. 
A. MODEL POLICY REVIEW 
Scholars, such as David Carter of Michigan State University, have developed 
model policies for intelligence-led policing. With cooperation from the Department of 
Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance, Carter developed a 300-plus-page guide to instruct 
law enforcement agencies in the art of intelligence in a post-9/11 era. 11  Model policies 
were also discussed from Australian and British perspectives in the early days of ILP 
implementation. J. Ratcliffe brings in examples from Australia and England to show that 
“local factors and recent history may hinder the adoption of some strategies and that 
arrogation of rhetoric may be easier than adopting the practices.”12 The model policies 
11  Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies.  
12  Jerry Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problems of Turning Rhetoric into Practice,” 
Policing & Society 12, no. 1 (2002): 53–66.  
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describe how or why an agency would use the ILP method of police work. In an article 
published by the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 
Ratcliffe points out that ILP is about “anticipating risks and improving public policy.”13 
Model policy development has also been examined by the Center for Problem Oriented 
Policing,14 whose work lays the groundwork for further research as well as provides 
guidelines to assist local agencies.  
B. DOCTRINE 
The literature review for definitions of doctrine was predominantly focused on: 
religious doctrine with an emphasis on dogmatism,15 and military doctrine16focused on 
direct publications that define military doctrine in correlation to specific operations such 
as Joint Intelligence Doctrine, Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, Counter Insurgency17  and 
Military Training doctrine; and recently some examples of U.S. government response 
agency doctrine18. The literature on doctrine and key word searches did not yield a 
specific study of the macro meaning and implementation of doctrine. Theory of doctrine 
should be pursued as a totality of examples that would be listed as “foundational 
documents” or guiding documents. The DoD publications on joint doctrine and joint 
intelligence specifically gave the most definitional significance. The DoD actually 
produced a military dictionary with three definitions for doctrine and subsets of 
doctrine.19  It could be argued that the literature regarding the U.K. Counter Terror 
Strategy called “CONTEST” reads more like a doctrine than a strategy. The U.S. 
13  Jerry Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action,” Intelligence 
(2010).  
14  Center for Problem Oriented Policing, University of Wisconsin, accessed July 29, 2013, 
www.popcenter.org.  
15  Milton Rokeach, “The Nature and Meaning of Dogmatism,” Psychological Review 61, no. 3 
(1954).194–204.  
16 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, (2013). 
17  Austin Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
1960–1970 and 2003–2006: (RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 6, Vol. 200Rand Corporation, 2008).  
18  FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1, 2010.  
19 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2013. 
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government doctrines from FEMA, and U.S. Forest were the few codified documents 
published that could be found under the direct search for “Doctrine.” Dictionary word 
searches gave general definitions, but the searches directly for the word “Doctrine” gave 
word associations in titles, and there were few sources outside of military doctrine to 
review. The word “Doctrine” was found in some publications to be associated with a 
particular person such as The Monroe Doctrine, The Jefferson Doctrine and The Bush 
Doctrine.  
C. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
From a theoretical framework perspective, the literature had numerous sources of 
information. The intelligence doctrine can be used to validate business models as Beck 
and McCue have shown that using advanced analytics in conjunction with established 
models (Community and Problem Oriented Policing) could make a smaller unit more 
productive. 20  There were examples of police intelligence perspectives based on 
quantitative and historical review as shown by Heaton.21  The review from a theory 
standpoint is rich in reviews and other documentation from respected authors within the 
criminal justice field. Using an example of theory, one could hypothesize the arrest data 
on a given night in a given town over time, and therefore could predict possible trends. 
This theory based on historical perspective is one subset of the theory that allows 
intelligence to help guide predictive analysis.22 Ratcliffe points out, “The most reliable 
indication of future criminal activity is current criminal activity.”  Also pointed out is the 
fact the criminal element uses tactics based on weaknesses in a system they can exploit 
until mitigating factors are introduced to defend against the known weakness.23 Theory in 
the literature continues to differentiate in the term crime analysis and criminal 
intelligence. As the blending of the two theories continues, Ratcliffe believes the term 
20  C. Beck and C. McCue, “Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-Mart and Amazon 
about Fighting Crime in a Recession?” Police Chief 76, no. 11 (2009): 6.  
21  R. Heaton, “The Prospects for Intelligence-led Policing: Some Historical and Quantitative 
Considerations,” Policing and Society: An International Journal 9, no. 4 (2000): 337–355.  
22  Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action.  
23  Ibid., 2.  
9 
 
                                                 
crime intelligence may be a better name. Ratcliffe points that crime analysis state what 
has happened, criminal intelligence states why it happened and crime intelligence is 
knowledge designed for action.24 
D. CASE STUDIES 
The literature review on case studies of police strategies were vast with baseline 
examples showing an agency using intelligence to make informed decisions usually on 
police officer deployment locations and deciding which enforcement philosophy/strategy 
should be used.25 The primary state police guide that was found is from the New Jersey 
state police and its work on bringing line level intelligence to all officers. Other 
documents showed the need for a paradigm shift to intelligence-led policing. The British 
National Intelligence Model26 was reviewed, and it shows a program that is built around 
the four main categories of Analytical Products, Intelligence Products, Knowledge 
Products, and System Products.27 The British National Intelligence Model gives distinct 
insight to doctrine and police intelligence operations and the importance of having a 
guiding document.  
The Model provides the picture that drives effective strategy, not just 
about crime and criminals, but for all law enforcement needs from 
organised crime to road safety. It is capable of use in relation to new or 
emerging problems within a force or operational command unit; to provide 
the strategic and operational focus to force, organisation or local command 
unit business planning. For Police Forces it has particular current 
application as it delivers the intelligence and analysis which is the basis of 
the Crime and Disorder Act audits and can serve the community 
intelligence requirements of ‘ Winning the Race. This work is the outcome 
of a desire to professionalise the intelligence discipline within law 
enforcement. Intelligence has lagged behind investigation in the 
24  Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action: 3. 
25  Joseph R. Fuentes, New Jersey State Police: Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing, ed. 
Center for Policing Terrorism (Manhattan: New Jersey State Police, 2006): 46.  
26  T. John, M. Maguire, and G. Britain, The National Intelligence Model: Key Lessons from Early 




                                                 
codification of best practice, professional knowledge and in the 
identification of selection and training requirements of staff. 28 
Other case studies were examples from police agencies and also a model policy 
giving the frameworks as Carter does with the DOJ guide for law enforcement. 29  
Additional case examples located were from Israel and France,30 as well as examples 
from England’s Home Office.31 The British model of CONTEST was chosen for review 
over the French and Israel cases as the British model is closer to our system and has more 
relevance to the thesis topic. In the Home Office framework, Tilley points out the 
convergence of problem oriented policing model and  intelligence-led policing model and 
asks the question “can they coexist?”  In this context of coexisting, the differences in 
problem oriented policing and intelligence-led policing define the different focus areas. 
We will address each of these in the case study chapter on police strategies. Tilley points 
out framework comparisons and asks hard questions as to the need to modify the ILP 
framework to be equal to problem oriented policing. The modification Tilley asks is 
under a guideline of intelligence-led policing to target the greatest threat, how does a 
police agency deal with other long-term policing problems, if the source of the problem is 
something other than a specific offender?  Tilley points out under the POP model, if the 
problem is identified and an intelligence operation is determined to be the best course of 
action, then POP allows for that to take place. Under the National Intelligence Model 
with a sole emphasis on targeting groups and people, Tilley argues police miss the 
opportunity to dig deeper into cause. The case study analysis will explore these issues 
deeper. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies.  
30 A. C. Kirchheimer, “A Comparative Study of Humint in Counterterrorism: Israel and France, 1970–
1990.” (2012). 
31  N. Tilley, “Problem-Oriented Policing, Intelligence-Led Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model.” London: Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College London (2003a).  
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E. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CYCLE 
As it relates to the actual cycle of intelligence and what actually goes into the 
product, the literature had examples of frameworks, as well as theory previously 
discussed primarily by Carter from Michigan State University.32  The intelligence cycle is 
well documented and discussed by Carter, Clapper, and Fuentes et al. Examples of the 
cycle found were specific to intelligence functions, guides to intelligence, problems 
associated with intelligence and the like. A difference in definitions from the national 
level of intelligence,33 as M. Lowenthal might frame versus what the New Jersey state 
police and Fuentes believes, are a result of the disparate needs of the intelligence 
community they serve. Collection requirements in law enforcement are different than the 
requirements in intelligence only agencies because of the need for prosecution. 
Lowenthal frames intelligence as information that has value for policy makers and 
decision makers primarily in and for the intelligence community to be delivered to those 
policy makers. 
F. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF GROUPS 
Most of the literature fell into what would be considered modern and recent time 
frames and ranged from broad to specifically narrow with step-by-step guidelines, such 
as those by Carter and produced by the Department of Justice. Source material for this 
topic is from Criminal Justice peer reviewed journals, (Criminal Justice Policy Review, 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice) federal government documents (FBI, DOJ and 
Rand) and guides (DOJ), respected associations, such as the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police and Universities with criminal justice programs. 
Most of the literature is positive on the need to use intelligence-led policing. In 
the current review, there were a few dissentions in reference to the use of intelligence-led 
police. The only negative slant on the use of ILP was concerns on privacy,34 and most 
32 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies.  
33  Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ press, 2011).  
34  Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action.  
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articles and readings were either a history of past abuse35 or cautions on dealing with 
privacy.36  Tilley questions the need to abandon other valuable methodologies such as 
problem oriented policing. The case study chapters will explore legal aspects, history 
and gaps in order to better understand the two sides of the ILP strategy and 
dissenting opinions on abandoning other types of law enforcement strategies. 
G. UNKNOWN/UNEXPLORED AREAS 
The thesis topic of state police entities with fusion center responsibility 
conducting domestic intelligence operations under a specific doctrine is under 
represented in the literature. The thesis will look specifically for state police-led domestic 
intelligence operations that transcend the local/federal membrane and perceived glass 
ceilings. Currently, articles specifically give New York state police, New Jersey state 
police, and state regional centers the majority of review specifically to how state police 
agencies are using ILP for day-to-day operations. The literature does not appear to 
include specific information to state lead domestic intelligence collection initiatives, 
except for examples like the Massachusetts state police using Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) data and field groups to reduce gun violence and other similar case studies on 
UCR data and response to that information to shift police deployment. There is also very 
little data conducting a comparison analysis on the three law enforcement strategies and 
which one is better for domestic intelligence doctrine development. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The literature on doctrine was sparse and singular in nature specifically to 
military/government or religion while that on intelligence-led policing is very factual, 
peer reviewed, accepted and abundant. There is a specific gap of literature that explains 
the state police role in intelligence operations for federal agencies and back down to the 
local LEA’s operations to reduce crime. The source material is useful to establish a 
35  Heaton, The Prospects for Intelligence-Led Policing: Some Historical and Quantitative 
Considerations, 337–355.  
36  Carter, Implement Intelligence-Led Policing in State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: 
Considerations and Processes, 1–19.  
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framework for review and an acceptable model for implementation. The gap remains on 
how to bridge federal intelligence needs and local needs while maintaining public 
support, and legal requirements. The research focuses on this gap and establishes a means 
to incorporate the academia framework with field relevant operations to establish a smart 
practice using doctrine as the guiding principle. This framework, blended with defined 
output/outcome measures, should allow a reader to establish a scale of success in the 
intelligence cycle. Establishing a doctrine without dogmatic restrictions of fear of change 
or lack of change with pure authoritative unchallengeable principles, and embracing 
pragmatic qualities that are dictated by practical consequences and lessons learned from 
actual occurrences, will be further reviewed by fusing of the case studies presented. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Chapter III will begin the case studies using U.S. law enforcement strategies, the 
U.K. Counter Terror Strategy of CONTEST, as well as a third case study of U.S. 
government doctrines in use. As the case studies are presented, a historical context will 
be presented. As the case studies are from foreign governments, as well as the DoD, legal 
aspects will be presented, as the need to make example cases fit into the U.S. system of 
government for domestic police work will be important. Each case study will be analyzed 
on how it fits into a law enforcement domestic intelligence doctrine. The first case study 
has three strategies and after the three are explained, the legal aspects and analysis for 
that study will be explored. The second case study will be defined as a single unit, and 
then the legal aspects, as well as how or where it fits will be presented. The third case 
study has three examples of doctrine in use, and as they are legally operating in the 
current systems, an analysis of how it fits will be the main points of the case study. 
A. CASE STUDY 1 
1. Introduction—U.S. Law Enforcement Domestic Strategies 
Current United States law enforcement policies, methods, strategies and 
guidelines that are used by each individual police department are usually dependent upon 
the chief executive (Chief, Director, etc.) of the individual agency. This autonomous 
nature of policing in the U.S. is geographically jurisdictional in nature and each 
community usually drives the political climate in order to influence the type of policing 
strategy that may be implemented. These same agencies need to conduct research to 
develop appropriate tactics based upon a needs assessment usually in the form of an 
analysis of crime rates specifically to Part 1 Uniform Crime Report categories. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the following definitions in Appendix II of 
their crime-reporting manual. 
The UCR Program collects data about Part I offenses in order to measure 
the level and scope of crime occurring throughout the Nation. The 
Program’s founders chose these offenses because they are serious crimes, 
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they occur with regularity in all areas of the country, and they are likely to 
be reported to police. The Part I offenses are: 
Criminal homicide ―Forcible rape ―Robbery ―Aggravated assault 
―Burglary (breaking or entering) ―Larceny-theft (except motor 
vehicle theft) ―Motor vehicle theft ―Arson ― 
The goals of law enforcement agencies are to reduce the crime rate, protect 
citizens and property, and engage the community to reduce fear. Literature, publications 
and academia recognize the top three strategies in U.S. law enforcement (LE) as problem 
oriented policing (POP) 37, intelligence-led policing (ILP) 38, and community oriented 
policing (COP). 39 With the exception of POP, most U.S. strategies have actually been 
retooled from the British policing models over the years. A sampling of agencies across 
the U.S. would likely show a hybrid approach using parts of all three, as a single set 
strategy does not always have the exact answer to a diverse communities’ crime problem. 
A blend of POP and COP has been a dominant fixture in U.S. law enforcement culture. 
Recently, an upswing in the strategy of ILP has been renewed. This section will give a 
brief history and methodology to the three types of strategies in order to begin the 
discourse on the LE domestic intelligence enterprise. Without understanding the culture 
of LE methods and history, the current ILP strategy and future ILP doctrine would not be 
scoped properly. An analysis on the missing doctrine in the current LE enterprise will 
begin the gap analysis for further review and research. 
a. Strategy 1: Intelligence-Led Policing 
Intelligence-led policing traces its history to the United Kingdom Home 
Office. Current definitions of ILP include an array of definitions based upon local police 
use and needs, as well as different government organizations; however, Carter with 
37 Center for Problem Oriented Policing.  
38  D. L. Carter and J. G. Carter, “Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations 
for Public Policy,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 20, no. 3 (2009b): 310–325.  
39  Lorie Fridell, and Ann Wycoff. Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future (Washington, 
D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2004).  
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Michigan State University uses the following philosophical definition from the U.S. 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan to express the idea:  
…an underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of 
a law enforcement organization. Rather than being simply an information-
clearing house that has been appended to the organization, ILP provides 
strategic integration of intelligence into the overall mission of the 
organization. 40 
According to the U.S. DOJ Global Justice Information Sharing Initiatives 
strategy document titled, “Navigating Your Agencies Path to Intelligence-Led Policing,” 
the definition of ILP is:41 
A collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving 
policing, information sharing, and police accountability, with enhanced 
intelligence operations. 
The definition was also stated in the same document as:  
ILP is executive implementation of the intelligence cycle to support 
decision making for resource allocation and crime prevention. In order to 
successfully implement this business process, police executives must have 
clearly defined priorities as part of their policing strategy. 
Ratcliffe in his book Intelligence-Led Policing defines ILP42 as: 
…a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and 
crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework 
that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention 
through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies 
that target prolific and serious offenders. 
Intelligence-led policing is thought of as a top down analysis of major 
crime targets identified through crime analysis, as well as developing criminal 
intelligence. Supervisory decision makers often decide this top threat focus, and then the 
40  Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies: 41.  
41 U.S. Deptartment of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, “Navigating Your 
Agency’s Path to Intelligence-Led Policing,” 2009. 
42  Jerry H. Ratcliffe. “What is Intelligence-Led Policing?” J. Ratcliffe, 
http://jratcliffe.net/research/ilp.htm (accessed July 21, 2013).  
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organization works off the directives based upon a decision maker’s review of the total 
threat assessment.43 
According to Ratcliffe, the U.K. police recognized they were spending a 
vast amount of time responding reactively to crime and not enough time targeting 
specific offenders. 44  The basic philosophy in ILP is proactive use of criminal 
intelligence, crime analysis, as well as HUMINT source recruiting of informants with 
access to the targeted individuals. 
James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, states that the post-9/11 
intelligence needs of national security require not only horizontal integration among the 
members of the formal intelligence community, but also vertical integration that includes 
domestic state-local-tribal law enforcement agencies.45  Clapper states that he has kept 
his Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Partners advisory board consisting of state 
and local police to advise him on the capabilities those domestic law enforcement 
agencies bring to the table with intelligence in the police community. 
Tilley points out that ILP is “focused on information collection and 
analysis…on offenders and networks of offenders, to inform smart enforcement focused 
on serious and prolific offending patterns.” 46   Tilley also emphasizes the strategic 
business model of ILP is used as targeted enforcement of people to reduce serious crime 
and not specifically addressing the root of crime. 
Intelligence-Led Policing is a new approach to conceptualize the need of 
targeted enforcement using threat analysis to make smart informed decisions on resource 
deployment. This concept of ILP, as previously stated, is more along the lines of a 
43 Ibid. 
44  Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “What is Intelligence-Led Policing?” J. Ratcliffe, 
http://jratcliffe.net/research/ilp.htm (accessed July 21, 2013).   
45  James R. Clapper Jr., “Effective Intelligence Must Remain a Top Priority,” The Police Chief 79, 
no. 3 (Mar 2012): 12.  
46  Nick Tilley, “Problem-Oriented Policing, Intelligence-Led Policing and the National Intelligence 
Model,” London: Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College London (2003b):2.  
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centrally regulated and disseminated tasking utilizing a mixing of law enforcement 
strategies.  
The New Jersey state police released a formal document47 outlining the 
goals and laying a road map to ILP. In it, they define ILP as “a collaborative 
philosophy that starts with information gathered at all levels of the organization that is 
analyzed to create useful intelligence and an improved understanding of the operational 
environment.”48 
b. Strategy 2: Problem-Oriented Policing 
Problem oriented policing began out of research to determine the root 
cause or problems that created a crime. This approach is credited as being a research-
based initiative created by Prof. Herman Goldstein University of Wisconsin School of 
Law. The Center for Problem Oriented Policing (CPOP) currently defines POP as:49 
…an approach to policing in which discrete pieces of police business are 
subject to microscopic examination in hopes that what is freshly learned 
about each problem will lead to discovering a new and more effective 
strategy for dealing with it. 
At the heart of the POP model is the method called SARA—Scanning, 
Analysis, Response, and Assessment. This clearly defined model asks police at every 
level of the organization to always be looking for problems in the community that may 
help facilitate the connection of time, space, victim and offender issues and 
understandings of correlations. Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment are more 
importantly a way to organize how to approach problems in a community or a crime in a 
community that is consistent or at least reoccurring. The following is taken directly from 
the Center for Problem Oriented Policing housed at the University of Wisconsin School 
of Law:50 
47  Fuentes, New Jersey State Police: Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing: 46.  
48 Fuentes, New Jersey State Police: Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing: 46.  




                                                 
Scanning: 
• Identifying recurring problems of concern to the public and the 
police. 
• Identifying the consequences of the problem for the community 
and the police. 
• Prioritizing those problems. 
• Developing broad goals. 
• Confirming that the problems exist. 
• Determining how frequently the problem occurs and how long it 
has been taking place. 
• Selecting problems for closer examination. 
Analysis: 
• Identifying and understanding the events and conditions that 
precede and accompany the problem. 
• Identifying relevant data to be collected. 
• Researching what is known about the problem type. 
• Taking inventory of how the problem is currently addressed and 
the strengths and limitations of the current response. 
• Narrowing the scope of the problem as specifically as possible. 
• Identifying a variety of resources that may be of assistance in 
developing a deeper understanding of the problem. 
• Developing a working hypothesis about why the problem is 
occurring. 
Response: 
• Brainstorming for new interventions. 
• Searching for what other communities with similar problems have 
done. 
• Choosing among the alternative interventions. 
• Outlining a response plan and identifying responsible parties. 
• Stating the specific objectives for the response plan. 




• Determining whether the plan was implemented (a process 
evaluation). 
• Collecting pre- and post-response qualitative and quantitative data. 
• Determining whether broad goals and specific objectives were 
attained. 
• Identifying any new strategies needed to augment the original plan. 
• Conducting ongoing assessment to ensure continued effectiveness. 
At the core of POP is the conceptual idea and what has been coined as the 
Crime Triangle.51 In theory, a crime or problem can only occur when a victim of the 
crime/problem comes in contact with an offender at some defined space without 
guardians in place to prevent the interaction. 
 
The POP model theory of the crime triangle also has a ring of protectors 
that should be present at all three sides of the triangle. The offenders have some sort of 
handlers, the victims have guardians, and each place has a manger. The thought is that 
there are many factors and possible interrupters before a crime or problem is facilitated. 
According to the CPOP,  
Effective problem-solving requires understanding how offenders and their 
targets/victims come together in places, and understanding how those 
offenders, targets/victims, and places are or are not effectively controlled. 
Understanding the weaknesses in the problem analysis triangle in the 
context of a particular problem will point the way to new interventions. 52  
51 Center for Problem Oriented Policing.  
52 Ibid.  
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The triangle theory argues that for a crime to take place, there has to be a 
suitable target, a lack of a guardian to prevent the action and a motivated offender present 
in a specific time and space. 
 
An example of this could be demonstrated that a high number of assaults, 
vehicle burglary, and robberies occur on a beat with a high number of incidents on Friday 
and Saturday nights between 0100 and 0400 hours. SARA would dictate the need to 
evaluate not just the offender but also the other two sides of the triangle. Arresting alone 
will not stop the crime, if the situation is such that it facilitates a “perfect storm.”  If the 
analysis shows the area is dark with little to no light and between public parking and an 
entertainment district, street lighting and sidewalks could be a place enabler in which the 
managers of those places did not correct issues. Adding lights, directing police foot/bike 
patrols and educating the public; have addressed all three sides of the triangle. Simply 
arresting offenders, who committed crimes of opportunity, will never reduce opportunity 
crimes. Creating an environment that reduces vulnerabilities and reduces opportunity, on 
the other hand, can be an effective crime prevention measure. 
c. Strategy 3: Community-Oriented Policing 
According to the Community Police Consortium, community policing is 
defined as “a collaborative effort between police and the community that identifies 
problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in the search 
for solutions to these problems.” 53  Community oriented policing (COP) advocates 
53  Fridell, and Wycoff, Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future: 3.  
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establish that the goal of the COP is not reactive law enforcement methodology from the 
so called “police professional era,” but as a broader approach to crime control with major 
work in crime prevention through maintaining order and improving living conditions.54  
The strategy behind COP is to reduce crime and disorder, promote citizens quality of life 
in communities, reduce fear of crime, and improve police-citizen relations.55  In the 
report from the Department of Justice by Maguire and Wells, 56  they point out the 
ambiguity in definitions when they studied 12 police agencies to determine what COP 
meant. In their study, with a host of other contributor’s, they decided on a scoped 
description of COP as “multidimensional policing reform movement.” The study had 
elements of that movement that were described further as characteristics of the COP and 
included: problem solving, community engagement and organizational adaptation. 57  
Community policing has as one of its core elements the principals of problem solving and 
borrow the POP model for that aspect. Community policing tends to want the police and 
the communities to not only identify the problems but also implement joint solutions. 58 
This principal is touted as having what would be considered stakeholder buy-in. 59 
Another example of COP is borrowed from Dr. Morabito and stated, as COP requires a 
proactive approach using technology and community resources to find new solutions to 
old problems.60 
Community policing is often used in the context of agencies getting away 
from a stand-alone philosophy of they know best and embracing a more community and 
private partnership collaboration in order to develop solutions.  
54 Ibid: 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Edward Maguire, and William Wells, Implementing Community Policing: Lessons from 12 
Agencies. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009).  
57Edward Maguire, and William Wells, Implementing Community Policing: Lessons from 12 Agencies 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, 2009): 18. 
58  Fridell, and Wycoff, Community Policing: The Past, Present, and Future.  
59  Maguire and Wells, Implementing Community Policing: Lessons from 12 Agencies.  
60  Melissa Schaefer Morabito, “Understanding Community Policing as an Innovation: Patterns of 
Adoption,” Crime & Delinquency 56, no. 4 (2010): 564–587. 
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2. Legal Aspects of LE Methods/Strategies 
The established predominant methods of policing as discussed (POP,ILP,COP) 
are well versed and established in current law both at the local and state level, as well as 
the federal level. The legality of methods of LE work is established by laws giving 
specific rights to agencies and jurisdiction based on either geographic area in the case of 
state and local LE, or by program as with the federal level. The use of doctrine as a 
guiding document will have no legal bearing as long as the doctrine is grounded at each 
level according to the laws that establish that agency.  
According to the 10th Amendment, the states have the ability to regulate items in 
their state not done by the federal rule of law. With the 10th Amendment, states have a 
well-established set of laws to deal with the requirements of society. Most states will 
have several codes written that guide the agency forward in how they will police. Most 
criminal laws are in a penal code, and guidelines on how to enforce those laws are 
usually codified in a code of criminal procedure. 
Doctrine at the state and local level will have to abide by each jurisdictional rule 
regarding penal law, code of criminal procedure, rules of evidence and open records, as 
well as some civil statutes. The established rules regarding day-to-day law enforcement 
should have no effect on an agency establishing or codifying a set of standards, ethics and 
principals, if grounded in existing law and regulations. 
3. Analysis 
While there remains a difference in all three U.S. LE strategies, there remain 
many clear similarities as explained. A majority of LE agencies have a hybrid approach, 
as the definition of each individual strategy has a distinct bias and an approach similar to 
the thought of “do we engage the public or do we engage the threat?”  Understanding the 
definitional issues, impediments to implementation, goals and outcome or output 
measures, would require a fundamental question to be asked: What is the goal of the 
police in a given community?  If we are to believe that communities have their own 
distinct needs and should be allowed to determine how they will be addressed by LE, 
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then we should also have an ability to set out a basic foundation of expectations that 
allows implementation as needed.  
The concept of descriptive and directive guidance could be explored in a 
doctrine that clearly establishes foundational descriptive guidance without being 
directive in methods or protocols. In other words, doctrine could establish a core 
foundation and describe the core philosophy, ethics, ethos, and explain “why” there is a 
need for intelligence in today’s criminal world. It then can allow each agency to establish  
“how” to do it, or “be directive” in orders and procedures. 
Funding for a particular method of implementation seems to drive the current 
labeling of a police agency.61 When the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act created COPS, 
five billion dollars was funded to establish COP. After 9/11, the “Intelligence Sharing 
Enterprise” became the buzzword/phrase and intelligence sharing became the new 
funding mechanism and agencies wanted to share information as well as obtain funding.  
While the IACP and others are trying to establish hometown security, each 
strategy has some place in that mission. However, the debate on funding, and which 
combination of strategies and methods of implementation are beyond the scope of this 
paper, it should be recognized that the impact of public perception, funding and 
transparency will continue to be a dominant factor in police strategy development. The 
further discussion and further research needed is an evaluation of a nationalistic approach 
versus a federalist approach to hometown security. As the national perspective is a 
baseline evaluation, then a nationalistic approach to solving problems could emerge as a 
possible method of solution oriented innovation. The innovation of local agencies to 
solve local problems should not be overlooked on the national stage. A top down push to 
solving local problems is not usually well received by a portion of the states. This top 
down push for local problems is often viewed as a federalist model where the federal 
government decides what is best for a particular state. Debates on health care, abortion, 
61 Melissa Schaefer Morabito, “Understanding Community Policing as an Innovation: Patterns of 
Adoption,” Crime & Delinquency 56, no. 4 (2010): 567–568.  
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marriage, guns and other socially viewed issues are a particularly decent litmus tests on 
how states receive federalist pushed agenda items. 
Doctrine will allow each state the ability to express its own view on local 
problems with a method to solve those problems at a very macro level. As states develop 
and learn ways to solve social problems, smart practices are developed and shared 
through a host of organizations up to and including FEMA. As many states establish 
preparedness plans, and response plans, the federal government has learned from these 
local plans and shared among the states particularly through FEMA lessons learned 
portals. The same could be true for LE doctrines at each level of local, county and state. 
With common language and common operating guidance, we have seen an increase in 
inter-operability with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Doctrine is the 
same, as it will put LE on a similar playing field with commonality but at local and state 
levels assuring inter-operability. Investing in a singular police strategy is a risk and 
similar to the analogy of putting all the eggs in a single basket. Directives from any level 
of government as a top down push bring criticisms from the lowest level practitioners 
who are the implementers of most strategy. Hybrid blending of strategies usually happens 
in law enforcement and is more ad-hoc than formal. Guiding principals of most law 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. hope for engagement in the community, while focusing 
on problems and trying to gather criminal intelligence to address strategic problems of 
crime. 
Leveraging formal doctrine as a descriptive recipe and allowing agencies the 
directive over-site to implementation, allows the very hybrid and innovative approaches 
that could bring real flexibility and engagement to law enforcement in the community 
while keeping the trust of the public with openness.  
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B. CASE STUDY 2 
1. Introduction—United Kingdom Counter Terror Doctrine 
The United Kingdom has created a program called CONTEST,62 which is their 
main counter terror strategy. CONTEST will be explored in this case study to be a 
comparative model from another country with a long history of combating terrorism 
domestically. We will explore the basic tenants of CONTEST, look at legal aspects on 
how the British use this concept, and how it may or may not fit in the U.S. with our legal 
restrictions and then do a comparison of strategies under an analysis section. 
2. Background 
The four methods of implementing the CONTEST strategy rely upon the ability to 
pursue, prevent, protect and prepare. According to the CONTEST publication, pursue is 
defined by stopping terror attacks, prevent is anti-radicalization efforts, protect is to 
strengthen targets and prepare is to mitigate the impact. Pursue is defined specifically as 
“stop terrorist attacks…by detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible 
stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and whenever 
possible, prosecuting those responsible.” Prevent is defined as “not just arresting and 
prosecuting terrorist…. but addressing radicalization to all forms of terrorism.”  Protect is 
defined as “strengthen protection against a terrorist attack…and reduce vulnerability.” 
The protect strategy includes Border Security. Prepare is defined as “work to mitigate the 
impact of a terror attack….including bringing a terror attack to an end as well as being 
more resilient.”63 
In order to implement the U.K. strategy, which could be argued is a doctrine; the 
U.K. has a system of layers for intelligence collection, as well as cooperation that 
transcends foreign and domestic intelligence collection and enforcement requirements. 
The U.K.’s intelligence services break down with foreign intelligence handled by the 
Secret Intelligence Service (AKA MI-6, Similar to our CIA), the Government 




                                                 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ-Similar to our NSA) and the Domestic Security 
Service (AKA MI-5).64  Though there are distinct differences in the U.S. model and the 
British models due to government make up, legislation, culture of trust in the government 
and the like; the Security Service (MI-5) has a close relationship with the U.K.’s fifty-six 
(56) main police departments, 65  which could be a goal to emulate for U.S. federal 
intelligence agencies and U.S. state police agencies. The direct communications of the 
MI-5 Agents in the regions with the law enforcement units, create a model of trust and 
cooperation.66  Though the U.K. does not have the tiered levels of police departments as 
we do, a proposal we could look at would be a structure in the framework that MI-5 could 
be equated to the FBI’s role and the 56 Police Departments could be related to our state 
police agencies in the U.S. 
Within each of the fifty-six (56) U.K. police departments, there is a group of 
vetted officers that work directly with the community, other police departments and MI-5 
Agents. These are known as the special branches. The special branches are mirrored in 
each of the police departments and all have a common operating platform.67  According 
to the Hampshire Constabulary (police department), the following is their definition of 
role and mission: 
The role of Special Branch is essentially to gather intelligence to meet 
national security requirements in line with the National Intelligence 
Model, as well as to support other policing priorities such as prevention of 
disorder, serious crime and organised crime. In the context of national 
security, Special Branch works closely with and in support of the Security 
Service, as well as with other national agencies. 
A key aspect of Special Branch intelligence gathering is that it extends 
the reach of the national agencies by utilizing the close links between 
local police and the communities they serve, (emphasis added) as well 
 
64  Todd Masse, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the 
United States. 2003.  
65  Home Office, Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom (U.K.: Home Office 





                                                 
as the contacts and access, which Special Branches maintain nationally 
and internationally. This linkage is a major strength of the U.K.'s national 
security structure and the envy of many countries. 
Much of the intelligence gathering work of Special Branch, whether 
undertaken solely by the branch or jointly with agencies such as the 
Security Service, involves sensitive information, equipment 
and techniques. 
The special branches could be equivalent to our U.S. LE models having a 
homeland security unit within a police department. The CONTEST model establishes that 
the Security Service is responsible for the intelligence collection operations and the 
special branch police responsible for the disruption and response portions of the overall 
strategy. As Peter Chalk states, “The Special Branch structure is the primary instrument 
through which intelligence is translated into operational activity and prosecutions.”68  
This split but equal representation allows for a coordinated response. The police will not 
be burdened by having collection requirements but will do what they are efficient at; 
respond and use the law to stop, and prosecute any threats discovered.  
In 2006, the U.K.’s Metropolitan Police Service merged their Anti-Terrorism 
Branch and their Special Branch to form the Counter Terror Command (CTC).69  This 
merge of services brings the previous expertise of intelligence, police operations, and 
investigations. The CTC has created four distinct strands: Intelligence, Investigations, 
Partnerships and Business. As with the above listed definition, the key role is to bridge 
community policing and national collection requirements.  
3. Political and Legal Aspects 
Legality of how MI-5 or MI-6 operates in England versus the United States is a 
separate issue and further research and discussion on legality is beyond this paper. The 
use of domestic agencies in the U.S. for the sole purpose of gathering intelligence on U.S. 
68  Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, “Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the 
Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 12; Hanah, 
A.O’Brien, and Rathmell, Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform: 14–15.  




                                                 
citizens would have to be very thoroughly reviewed for consistency with following and 
preserving the U.S. constitutional rights of each U.S. citizen. Aspects of actual 
intelligence gathering comparisons are not explored in this research; however, the 
challenges may be assumed to be quite hefty, and therefore, not likely to be replicated 
within the scope of legal intrusions that the U.K. system allows. 
Politically, the challenges of a federal government gathering information about 
U.S. citizens have hit a high in recent history with the NSA Prism leak, the Wiki-Leaks 
information, as well as federal government use of drones, wire taps and FISA court 
searches. The U.S. citizenry appear to be in a mode of distrust, and politically the 
decision to support intrusive spying on people is yet to be fully determined. 
The U.S. citizen is afforded expected protections under the U.S. constitution and 
every attempt to side step those protections may bring unwanted scrutiny on agencies. 
Comparing the doctrine of CONTEST with citizen protections and relating that to the 
U.S., we would have to decide how and where the concepts of CONTEST would fit in 
U.S. LE models. Using CONTEST as a model or doctrine would be acceptable as long as 
the strategies and methods of implementation were grounded in U.S. law and specifically 
the U.S. constitution. The guiding philosophy of CONTEST is not at odds with U.S. law 
enforcement ability to adopt the descriptive guidelines. The issue is how MI-5 and MI-6 
implement the guidance by the very nature of their laws, which allow for a different 
level of accepted intrusion by the government into the populace. 
CONTEST clearly lays out problems and offers guidance and directions in 
handling the established problem of terrorism. Establishing the same concept from a U.S. 
model would likely have to be pushed to state and local levels for methods and strategy to 
implementation; however, the use of the doctrine could be used to begin a way for federal 
agencies and states to discuss the areas presented in CONTEST to see if we have similar 
thoughts and means to counter the established threat of terrorism.  
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4. Analysis of CONTEST 
A listing approach will be used with the major themes of Information Sharing, 
Joint Investigations Ability, Secure Communications and Information Exchange being 
explored and compared. The comparisons of how U.S. LE currently uses the theme and 
how the U.K. implements the theme will be examined. The scope of this will be both 
theoretical and philosophical as the exact output measures and outcome measures are not 
conducive to conduct a quantitative comparison—as such, we will use a subtle qualitative 
comparison that may be open to further discourse. 
a. Information Sharing 
In the current U.S. policing model, information sharing is a voluntary 
methodology that is most often controlled at the local levels. The U.S. federal intelligence 
and law enforcement enterprise have had some legislation that addresses information 
sharing in the intelligence enterprise between the U.S. federal government and local 
stakeholders.70 This is a slow and sometimes not adhered to directional movement that 
could be criticized and characterized metaphorically as “moving a cargo ship with a 
dingy.”  As a result of the attacks in 2001 and more currently the Boston bombing, we 
have seen a repeated conundrum of information analysis, sharing and distribution based 
on perceived need to know. This intelligence cycle continues to break down in the U.S. 
law enforcement models.  
The British strategy of having domestic intelligence agents in the 
communities working directly with cleared and vetted special branch police officers, 
appear to have broken down any fear, mistrust, silo’s, and roadblocks relating to talking, 
sharing and collaboration. 71  The missing connection of face-to-face contact and 
continuous operational cohesiveness we have in the U.S. LE model does not appear to be 
prevalent in the U.K. The major police departments in the U.K., due to not being in 
70  Randol, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, 
2010.  
71  Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and 
Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 14–15.  
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competition within the same region with other LE departments, as well as working on a 
common strategy clearly defined by a federal cabinet (Home Office), have a cross flow of 
information sharing in addition to a vertical flow of information. The U.S. model is 
vertical flow, usually following an ad-hoc policy program of transferring information 
rather than sharing intelligence. There is a movement to use XML data protocols and to 
share information in the U.S. but most agencies have little incentive to invest money in 
infrastructure to get up to standards. The use of a data-encoding platform accessible to all 
LE agencies in a region would enhance flow of information. The U.K. system example 
has a web-based system as copied from the CONTEST Strategy:72 
Communications between emergency responders have improved, but there 
is still more work to do. Two-thirds of eligible emergency responders have 
protected access to mobile networks during emergencies. Around 500 
organisations can now share classified information with each other, using 
the National Resilience Extranet which also enables web-based planning 
and crisis management. 
b. Joint Investigation Ability-Local to National 
The U.S. LE community does have a formal model to conduct joint 
investigations between U.S. federal agencies and those agencies regulated by states (State 
Police, County Sheriff, and Local PD’s). The joint operations are most often controlled 
by and run by federal agencies. The largest and most well known task forces (TF) 
include: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force (HIDTA-DEA), Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF-FBI), Safe Streets Task Force (SAFE-FBI), Regional 
Fugitive Task Force (U.S. Marshals), and Cyber Investigations (U.S. Secret Service). 
Within a region, multiple agencies will usually detach an officer under a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) to these TF’s. The missing connection is standards of mission sets, 
formal standing requirements for operations, cross talk and data sharing. The U.K. model 
also has a regional approach to their policing models with each regional police 
department having an independent impartial nonpolitical role. This adheres to what is 
known as the Peel theory named after Robert Peel in the 1840s during the founding of the 
72  Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2011.  
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professional police officer. Though the Crown gives the authority, the local nature of the 
region direct and run the operations.73  The difference in the U.S. model is that each level 
of government has a police force based on the government jurisdiction that is directed by 
a chief executive officer. The state has oversight on standards; however, the state does 
not give direction, coordination or oversight to each level of the police services that the 
U.K. model74 has through the Home Office. The U.K. model  gives regional police and  
national level intelligence assets75  the ability to work jointly through a common model 
and platform, which is foundationally the same across the U.K.76 The ability of the U.K. 
model to mobilize nationwide assets under a common operating picture on common 
communication platforms, allows for seamless joint operations or response.77 
c. Secure Communications-Sensitive Information Exchange 
The common complaint from U.S. law enforcement at the local and state 
level is the restricted access of classified information. Though the environment has 
greatly improved since 9/11, the lack of sharing a domestic threat intelligence piece is 
still common. The U.S. DHS has taken great strides in giving Secret level clearance to 
state and local LE and access to their secure communications net. The issue though is the 
dual purposed homeland mission by both the FBI and DHS, and then who will share what 
information with whom?  As the FBI is considered the lead domestic intelligence agency, 
DHS is considered the face of interaction with state and local law enforcement. To date, 
the FBI has not usually given clearances to state and local police unless they are actively 
apart of a formal task force office in an FBI building. The thought of insider threats 
continue to haunt the FBI and the U.S. IC, and that is often used as an excuse for the lack 
of access. The U.K. special branches are local officers with the belief they have the 
73  Association of Chief Police Officers, Policing in the U.K.: A Brief Guide (London: Association of 
Chief Police Officers, 2012).  
74  Home Office, Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom, 2011.  
75  Home Office, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2011.  
76  National Criminal Intelligence Service. The National Intelligence Model. (United Kingdom: 
National Criminal INteligence Service, 2000).  
77  United Kingdom, Total Policing CTC.  
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greatest amount of knowledge on the ground.78  The vetting process and exchange of 
information is regulated to protect methods, sources and the likes; however, the 
information on targets is greatly shared. The U.K. model using special branches is an 
example of having cleared knowledgeable people at the ready to be used as a force 
multiplier of MI-5 when needed. The special branch officers are dedicated intelligence 
officers who take direction from the police chief and the domestic security MI-5 in 
information requests, intelligence products and assessments.79  In order to effectively 
maintain communications in the event of an emergency, the U.K. has established a secure 
communications network (linking police, ministries of government and key stakeholders) 
known as the National Resilient Extranet, the High Integrity Telecommunications 
System, and Privileged Access Schemes (https://www.gov.U.K./resilient-
communications). This communication network is rated to send and receive at the 
restricted communications level and allows for a rapid sharing of information.  
Currently, similar systems the U.S. LE has are Law Enforcement Online 
(LEO) and at the secure communications level the Homeland Security Data Network 
(HSDN). Though both of these are secure, very little buy in to daily logging on in LEO 
has occurred in the LE enterprise, as most information is scattered, non-relevant and 
cumbersome. The HSDN network requires a secret level certified facility and those are 
near nonexistent to LE personnel outside of specific units at a handful of fusion centers in 
each state. 
The U.K. Model codified in CONTEST shows a serious doctrinal concept 
outlying a plan that is authoritative but not specific in strategic deployment or methods to 
implement. This guiding document has a level of direction that most of the police and 
security service personnel could use when a leadership or question arises as to the 
mission and goals of the counter terror effort in the U.K. 
78  Home Office, Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom. 2009.  
79 Home Office, Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom. 2009.  
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C. CASE STUDY 3 
1. Multidisciplinary Perspectives of Doctrine 
a. Introduction to General Doctrine 
DoD Joint Publication1-2, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms:80 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements there of 
guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but 
requires judgment in application. 
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary: 
Something that is taught, a principle or position or the body of principles 
in a branch of knowledge or system of belief, a statement of fundamental 
government policy especially in international relations, a military principle 
or set of strategies. 
When defining doctrine, the pre-eminent source of reading and modeling 
is from the armed forces. In the current DoD framework, they have established joint 
publications81 as a formal doctrine that each service will be guided by when working in 
nonsingular tactical operations. FEMA has also published Publication 182 in 2010 that 
serves as “a capstone doctrine…. that defines our principals and culture, describes our 
history, mission, purpose, and ethos.”  The fire service under the leadership of the U.S. 
Forest Service has a core doctrine in its publication Wildland Fire Suppression: 
Foundational Doctrine.83  There are other examples of doctrine based upon court or case 
precedence known as legal doctrine, principles that are given a name of the author such 
as the Monroe Doctrine, Bush Doctrine etc., and religious doctrine depending upon the 
faith. There is a glaring example of doctrine when we look at the U.S. Constitution in the 
definitional framework as above and believe it is the core set of beliefs that lay a 
80  U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms.  
81  U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States. 
82  FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1. 2010.  
83  Edward D. Hollenshead et al., Fire Suppression: Foundational Doctrine (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, 2005).  
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principle to guide our decisions in how we operate a complex adaptive system called the 
United States. 
Doctrine is often and more commonly thought of as the philosophical 
foundation that is authoritative but not specifically directive. Practitioners, managers and 
executives often miss this key component of nondirective. Strategies often give the path 
to take off the doctrine road map and begin to give guidance and direction. If doctrine is 
the foundation; then strategies, methods, and policies should be capacity. Most LE and 
homeland security (HLS) practicing professionals are often caught in the capacity cycle 
(the ability to do the job), and that is where they should be. An analogy could be framed 
as practitioners do the process, managers supervise the process’s of a strategy and leaders 
are thinking of how we do it better (innovative organizational change) while staying true 
to a core belief (Doctrine) and smart practices (Strategy). Everyone can be a leader and 
doctrine gives everyone the ability to lead in the framework of a common picture, 
philosophy, and ethic. Adaptation of a doctrine is often thought of as an impossible task 
but is it really?  
In order to see how this term “Doctrine” is used in practical scenarios or 
operations, we will discuss a few U.S. Government Doctrines. Some will be Federalist 
and some will be more Nationalist in nature. 
2. Example 1: Department of Defense 
The DoD currently has the best model of comparison, as it has published manuals 
titled “Doctrine.” These publications clearly set out definitions, expectations, guiding 
principles and are endorsed by the DoD leadership. DoD Joint Publication 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, sets out in its 
second page, the scope, purpose, application and update schedule. In the very beginning 
of the document, it states that the purpose is to improve communication and 
understanding of terms used, and it is to be the primary terminology source when creating 
correspondence, including policy, planning documents, strategy and doctrine. This 
document gives definitive guidance at the level of the Joint Chief of Staff without 
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directing what word to use to accomplish a task. The established document 
also creates an update cycle with directions on how to modify, replace or edit 
terminology as needed. This creates a pragmatic document that does not become non-
relevant archaic shelfware. 
The DoD created Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 
United States. (JP-1)84  According to JP-1, it is the “capstone publication for all joint 
doctrine, presenting fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the 
employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.”  Additionally, JP-1 “ties joint 
doctrine to the national security strategy and national military strategy and describes the 
role in the development of national policy and strategy.”  Another important piece we 
could learn from DoD doctrine is the statement that can sum up the importance of the 
DoD’s belief in a well written guiding principal. 
With the exception of Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine will not 
establish policy. However, the use of joint doctrine standardizes 
terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among 
all U.S. forces to free joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to 
focus their efforts on solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems. 
Using historical analysis of the employment of the military instrument of 
national power. 
Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence is the doctrine on Intelligence. As a 
guiding principled document, the publication states:  
This vital keystone publication forms the core of joint intelligence doctrine 
and lays the foundation for our forces’ ability to fully integrate operations, 
plans, and intelligence into a cohesive team. 
The argument of needing discretion, needing to be innovative, needing the ability 
to be flexible and creative to shifting environments or other complaints is often cited as a 
reason not to have a doctrine. In JP-2-0, there is also a clearly defined applicability clause 
that allows the discretion of commanders. The following is taken directly from 
JP-2-0: 
84  U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States. 2013.   
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3. Application 
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, 
commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task 
forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.  
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine 
will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, 
exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the 
contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this 
publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 
Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or 
coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and 
procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 
ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the 
multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and 
consistent with U.S. law, regulations, and doctrine. 
3. Example 2: U.S. Forest Service 
Wildland Fire Suppression Foundational Doctrine opens with a quote from Visa 
Founder Dee Hock, “Simple clear purpose and principals give rise to complex 
intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple stupid 
behavior.” (Emphasis added) Tom Harbour furthers the quote by saying, “We are focused 
on defining those simple clear principles that will encourage complex intelligence 
behavior.” (Emphasis added) 85 
According to the U.S. Forest Service, the organizational change needed for 
Wildland fire fighting needed a revamping of foundational ideas. According to the 
doctrine introduction on the needs of a doctrine, the authors point out over the years, the 
response to major wildland fires have been under extreme scrutiny. The responses were 
thought of as tactical in nature, and as a result more prescriptive policies were 
implemented in order to correct perceived shortcomings. The result, according to the 
doctrine, was simply confusion and frustration in trying to accomplish a dynamic and 
ever changing threat environment. 
85 Hollenshead et al., Fire Suppression: Foundational Doctrine, 1.  
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The Forest Service clearly states in its doctrine that the increase in hard rules and 
lack of ability to think critically by imposing additional check lists rules have actually 
increased the likelihood of failure. The doctrine states that the tradition of measuring 
success was not based upon appropriate decisions and behaviors, but more about having a 
lack of bad outcomes.86  
A key component of the doctrine that relates most to this thesis is stated as an 
objective of establishing a doctrine. It states “The ability to develop and instill our 
firefighters and leaders with an understanding of how to think and not what to 
think.”(Emphasis added) 87  The publication is an example of documenting not only the 
reasons why we do a task, but also show the reader the past mistakes or past failures in a 
hope not to repeat them. This doctrine on firefighting gives as it states, the ability to make 
a decision with the best interests in mind at the lowest level. The philosophy is driven 
from a perspective of empowerment and not one of constraint. As doctrines are explored, 
commonalities are principles, morals and ethics. This fire fighting doctrine goes beyond 
the mantra of fire fighting being a “manual labor put the water on the fire”, and into a 
critical thinking strategic life and property saving mantra. By establishing the ethical 
priorities in a document, the firefighters can read and memorialize the basic concepts of 
their mission more readily. 
4. Example 3: Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Pub 1 as part of its introduction states “Pub 1 communicates who and what FEMA 
is, what we do, and how we can better accomplish our missions. Pub 1 defines our 
principles and culture, and describes our history, mission, purpose and ethos.”88   It also 
states specifically: 
The capstone doctrine should help to advance the practice of consistent 
decision-making by those with the authority to act. While the guidance is 
authoritative, it is not directive, and when applied with judgment, it can be 
86 Hollenshead et al., Fire Suppression: Foundational Doctrine, 3. 
87 Ibid, 1.  
88 FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1, 2.  
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adapted to pertain to a broad range of situations. The guidance is intended 
to promote thoughtful innovation, flexibility, and proactive performance in 
achieving FEMA’s complex mission. This document provides managers, 
supervisors, and employees with the set of values and principles to which 
they can all expect to be held accountable. 
FEMA Pub 1 is broken into chapters covering: History, Roles and Mission, Ethos 
and Core Values, Guiding Principals, and Authority. The doctrine established allows a 
new employee to get a sense of where the agency was in the past, how it got to where it is 
now, what is expected and on what authority it stands. This foundational core is an 
example of basic doctrine not being prescriptive in a response sense; however, it is 
prescriptive in ethos, principals and guidance. A prescriptive guiding principal listed is 
innovation. This very item of innovation is counter to the previously held notions that 
doctrine is dogmatic and in flexible. FEMA Pub 1 establishes innovation as a 
requirement of its very foundation.89 
The FEMA Pub is long and reads like a new employee handbook. The critical 
aspects may be nestled in an attempt to create an identity. The idea of creating or 
establishing an identity is grounded in social identity theory and has a place in the 
discourse on doctrine. FEMA does a good job on establishing how it started from major 
fires and was slowly granted more responsibility including bringing many disparate 
preparedness agencies under one roof. It also explains the post-9/11 era and how it was 
sliced up in DHS and again put back together. This history lesson is important as external 
stakeholders who may be influenced by biased reporting, can get a sense of the identity of 
the FEMA worker, as well as any new hire. An ability to know why and how we get to a 
position in a dynamic world and chaotic response organization may just be the glue that 
holds order in chaos. 
5. Analysis of Government Examples 
Government agencies from DoD to fire to preparedness agencies see the need to 
establish foundational thinking to establish their place in society. The doctrines presented 
89  Ibid. 
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were a cross section of different types of organizations working on different levels of 
response or mitigation or even as a deterrent. The commonalities among all the examples 
were that of: ethics, morality, principals, core beliefs, innovation, history and the question 
with the answer of who are we. 
Intelligence communities, as well as domestic law enforcement agencies, are 
lacking in the doctrine aspect. Government documents establishing a set standard in a 
single codified document are lacking in most state, local and federal organizations that 
have intelligence and law enforcement response requirements. Attempting to broach turf 
wars, budget allocations and mission creep is outside the scope of this paper; however, an 
inside look at the microcosms of these “battle” areas could be a focus of further research. 
As doctrine establishes some principals, could we have a lack of established principals in 
the intelligence-sharing environment?  Could the competitive nature of intelligence 
rewards in budget allocation mean knowledge is power, and therefore, sharing is 
obsolete?  Do we have an environment of common definitions, common goals, common 
platforms, common sharing requirements or common collection requirements codified 
and published for domestic agencies working intelligence operations in and for the 
United States?   
Richard Immerman in his writing, Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence 
Communities Best Kept Secret, 90  argues some of these points as roadblocks to the 
intelligence community development and further explains how the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI) leadership and transformation has gone slightly 
unnoticed in the organizational change of the IC. Immerman also points out that 
academia fails to look at progress in the positive light and uses past failures to conduct 
analysis. In his piece, there is an argument that could be made that the ODNI is actually 
establishing doctrine piece meal, by making people and agencies work together by 
establishing specific philosophical organizational change. Codifying this change and 
 
90  Richard H. Immerman, “Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community’s Best Kept Secret.” 
Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2–3 (2011): 159–181.  
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requirement in writing other than executive orders (12333 to be exact) or Intelligence 
Community Directives (ICD 203 and ICD 206 for example) may be the biggest challenge 
to the IC.  
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IV. SO WHAT?  WHY DO WE NEED A DOCTRINE? 
The current components of law enforcement (LE) intelligence gathering rely on 
standards of LE established through the lens of the criminal justice framework.91  The 
basis for the current components of the collection of criminal intelligence lay in the 
legality, privacy of information, citizen protections (court orders) and general acceptance 
of the tradecraft. The current model used is an ad-hoc collection of proposed guidelines, 
strategies and methods that are not codified in a formal document. 92   This ad-hoc 
approach to leveraging the strategy of intelligence-led policing creates a lack of 
comprehensive, clear and repeatable metrics across the U.S. police enterprise. Currently 
in LE, departments are conducting a mash up of intelligence-led, community oriented and 
problem oriented policing93 with the only accountable metric being UCR data reduction 
primarily in the Part I crime index. Codifying a formal template with multiple strategies 
can and would create the doctrine needed to begin the baseline achievements of 
information and intelligence sharing. By establishing the doctrine, organizations can 
evaluate where they are and how this will affect their individual operations. It will also 
allow agencies to identify common platforms, such as N-DEX and the Global Justice 
Exchange system in order to develop true sharing capability that is more efficient and 
effective in actual exchanges.94   
Having common language, common platforms and common tradecraft would 
allow transparency and public relations to increase. In summation, a Domestic 
Intelligence Doctrine would have and create new organizational implications, create 
new collection and sharing platforms, create commonality, and put the public at ease. 
91 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management 
for Law Enforcement Leaders.” (2007). 
92  Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problems of Turning Rhetoric into Practice,: 53–66.  
93  Carter and Carter, Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public 
Policy: 310–325.  
94  U.S. Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Navigating Your 
Agency’s Path to Intelligence-Led Policing.  
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There becomes the dogmatic approach that causes groupthink, stagnation, 
organizational “closing in” (which nothing from the outside is allowed in) and the like. A 
more pragmatic approach would be along the lines of allowing creativity (thinking of 
new things) as well as innovation (doing new things.)  Could doctrine survive a 
pragmatic approach to review while keeping dogmatic core belief?  It could be argued 
that the U.S. Constitution is a dogmatic doctrine established as a solid core philosophy 
that is very rarely treaded upon, and in those times it was, there were significant changes 
due to societal needs. Does this document with its amendments show us the ability to 
change, be interpreted and stand for something?  A metaphor on doctrine could be 
explained as: a solid foundation (doctrine) on shifting soil (day to day problems) 
establishes refuge for a structure during rain or drought. The building materials 
(strategies) attached to the foundation could be different depending on an agencies 
climate or location in the country. This combination of foundation and materials establish 
a way to protect and serve a community (methodology) while keeping with the faith of 
the premise the foundation is the most important aspect of any house. Those managers in 
each clime would have better baseline definitional background and could manage the 
process as needed with little further guidance while grounded in policy. How we build a 
house and what materials we need in the dessert southwest, may not be suitable to the 
pacific northwest. New policy should be a result of a shifting methodology to fulfill a 
strategy based upon doctrine at the lowest level.  
By establishing additional metrics to grade the value in changing the dynamics of 
LE work toward establishing an intelligence doctrine, a baseline needs assessment would 
more than likely indicate that the doctrine should establish new focus areas. LE agencies 
in the United States are primarily made up of small agencies that do not have dedicated 
intelligence units, dedicated crime analyst or criminal intelligence analyst; they rarely 
have direct appointments to the FBI-JTTF, are unsure of the DHS fusion center call for 
Intelligence Liaison Officers and Terrorism Liaison Officers and usually are answering 
call-to-call with the leadership often graded by UCR crime data reports for the 
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community.95  So while federal and state government agencies have well-established 
intelligence components, most local police agencies do not. Those that do, usually have 
liaison officers of a hybrid unit that does gang, drug, and crime statistical analysis.  
Understanding the intelligence function begins with/by establishing macro level 
goals, based upon macro level definitions with macro strategies. As each agency 
establishes its baseline to the macro understanding, methodologies are placed based upon 
capacity. In order to accomplish this, the doctrine should list and prioritize goals of the 
program to better understand what intelligence is, shift to a 
philosophical/comprehensive/holistic based thinking rather than a case specific model, 
and establish community buy-in to secure the needed support of why and how this 
doctrine is a good thing for the U.S. citizen.96  Exploring the difference between holistic 
and case specific needs to be addressed in context. Most intelligence functions in law 
enforcement serve to produce a specific product usually for specific cases. The exception 
to this is crime statistics analysis compilation for command review. In the context of 
strategic documents, the crime statistical reports could be argued is information not 
intelligence. The debate on products is further blurred as how information, even with 
value, is used and could change the definition to an intelligence product. Again, we have 
micro definitions of information versus intelligence based upon the needs of different 
police agencies. There is no definitive widely accepted definition of crime statistic 
analysis being more information or more intelligence. Doctrine could establish that the 
crime statistics report for a time period is simply information. The same report—fused 
with data sets not open to the public in which decision makers put forth a tactical plan or 
strategic plan—could be argued is an intelligence product because the decisions to 
modify or change approaches or operations were a result of new information that had 
value. 
95  D. L. Carter, and J. G. Carter, “The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 36, no. 12 (2009a): 1323–1339.  




                                                 
The doctrine of domestic intelligence should do the following in order to be 
accepted and successful in a new paradigm shift.  
5. Eliminate 
a. Fear among the populace of a “big brother” being all knowing 
b. Misunderstandings of why intelligence is needed and what it is 
6. Reduce 
a. Failures/weak signal interpretations  
b. Concerns about privacy rights by having transparent 
methodologies 
7. Raise 
a. Awareness of privacy processes and protections that will be in 
place 
b. Protections in the forms of law and policy concerning LE actions 
8. Create  
a. A baseline doctrine of Domestic Intelligence 
b. Comprehensive model of intelligence thinking versus case specific  





A. HURDLES OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Organizational change comes slow. Out of crisis comes what could be called  
“action imperative syndrome.”97 If action imperatives are: strict commands and verbs, 
people tasked with immediate following of orders, the environment is blind to unintended 
consequences; then we have set up an environment of ready fire aim. This thought 
process that we need to act right here right now, can be estimated to have caused what is 
often phrased as “knee jerk” reactions and waste in government. The establishment of 
doctrine could give a balanced approach to crisis. The current roadblock of 
implementation is the lack of some academia, as well as the portions of federal 
intelligence community to recognize the community perception and importance of the 
motto coined by the IACP and then DHS, “Hometown Security is Homeland Security.”98  
While definitional issues continue to plague government, a simple definition of 
intelligence99 is an often-heated debate based on practitioners and executives giving their 
roles in the greater strategy and not the macro definition we should be talking about. The 
confusion on Intelligence Doctrine versus Intelligence Strategy versus Methodology 
versus Policy is not in the the scope of this paper; however, the current discourse on 
intelligence continues to be comparative grand standing based on practitioners and 
supervisors giving their current roles in intelligence as the way instead of saying it is a 
way.  The ability to get a room full of LE executives to agree on a doctrine is no easier 
than getting a group of politicians to agree on a matter. The underlying problems of 
definitions, ethics, morality, concession and humility will need to be worked on one 
meeting at a time.  
97 Captain Franklin uses this statement in teaching SWAT and Organized Crime classes to show 
humans have a need to do something right here and right now. Captain Franklin states we have a need to do 
actions and believe our decisions and actions are imperative to resolve an issue. This imperative to do 
something, if done haphazardly creates additional risks in any operation and many LE and HLS 
professionals do snap judgments versus cost benefit analysis decisions. 
98  International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: 
IACP’S Principals for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy:1–9.  




                                                 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) did just that in a 
meeting in late 2004. The IACP developed a project they titled “Taking Command 
Initiative.”100  This initiative was a discourse in what was working and what was not 
working at the federal, state, local and tribal levels in homeland security. During the 
discourse, the participants established “the current homeland security strategy is 
flawed… It was developed without sufficiently seeking or incorporating the advice, 
expertise or consent of public safety organizations at the state, local and tribal levels.”101  
In the meeting, the IACP “established five key principles that must form the basis for, 
and be incorporated into, the development and implementation of a national homeland 
security strategy, if it is to be successful in protecting our communities from the menace 
of terrorism.”102   
The five principles are:  
1. All Terrorism is Local  
2. Prevention is Paramount  
3. Hometown Security is Homeland Security  
4. Homeland Security Strategies Must Be Coordinated Nationally not 
Federally  
5. The Importance of Bottom Up Engineering, The Diversity of the 
State, Tribal and Local Public Safety Community & 
Noncompetitive Collaboration 
These five basic principles in homeland security are doctrine-based philosophy 
used to establish a strategy. The hurdles again come from federal partners and not 
100  International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: 
IACP’S Principals for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy:1–9.  
101 Ibid. 
102  International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: 
IACP’S Principals for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy,:1–9.  
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necessarily the other LE partners. The 9/11 Commission established the presence of 
federal IC turf wars, and it is still an issue today. Doctrine can begin the process of 
dismantling a wall and building a coalition foundation to further the strategies needed. 
B. MULTI-DISCIPLINE RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 
Within the goals of establishing a State-Level Intelligence Doctrine, the 
cooperation and relationship of several stakeholders are paramount if we are to garner 
acceptance and legitimacy. The groups associated with a successful doctrine would 
include law enforcement, the public, formal organizations outside of LE, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and academia, courts, and formal criminal 
justice members, such as the county and district attorney offices. 
Doctrine should be a foundational document103 that is based in philosophical 
truths that are accepted and engineered from the ground up. In creating a collaborative 
document, the IACP uses a quote that states that “Homeland Security Strategies Must Be 
Coordinated  Nationally Not Federally.” 104   This quote shows the need for formal 
doctrine for each state and the bottom up engineering of policy, strategy and methods to 
fulfill the doctrine. The IACP believes that the above approach, if done from the locals 
up, as a national perspective, gives each agency and state equal partnerships in 
developing a  national strategy. The thoughts of so-called federalism and federal 
directives tend to separate the discourse into a Social Identity Theory of Us versus Them 
(SIT). SIT continues to show us that group conflict is a hurdle to group cohesion. In the 
light of establishing my way as the only correct way (my in-group), then I will demean or 
otherwise reduce the status of other groups to bolster my claims and status in the 
community. Could it be said that turf wars are an example of group conflict, status 
challenges and impediments to intelligence community cohesion? Eliminating fear, 
misunderstandings, turf wars etc., requires local stakeholder buy in that is only developed 
103 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, 2013.  
104  International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: 
IACP’S Principals for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy:1–9.  
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with cohesive partnerships. If the states had a state doctrine on what that state believed 
the homeland security enterprise would look like, they would be better prepared to fulfill 
a national directive as the definitions, philosophy, guidelines and buy-in would be well 
established and would take in all the local concerns. An overriding example would be 
along the southwest border. For states in the mid-west or on the east coast, having police 
chases that the criminals throw out tire deflation devices (Caltrops) to make a run back to 
the border and “Splash-Down” in the Rio Grande river seems far-fetched and not a 
strategic concern. Texas, however, believed the situation to be extremely important and 
made a law outlawing the mere possession of the devices (Caltrops). This individual state 
perspective to a broader national strategy would also leverage the crowd sourcing of 
problems across the country. By examining the different regions, a pattern analysis could 
readily be seen and handled. 
Establishing a State Level Intelligence Doctrine gives many disciplines the ability 
to conduct a needs assessment of man-made potential incidents from an unbiased and 
professional approach. When looking at risk, the often-misused data set is the threat 
information. (Risk=ThreatxVulnerabilityxConsequence). This lack of good threat 
analysis and data could be argued has cost many more dollars than was needed. The 
“Black Swan” events were addressed even though risk of them happening were very low. 
Muliti-disciplined intelligence reporting, analyzing and disseminations create a standard 
operating picture for all homeland security disciplines to use to develop their individual 
operating picture. Currently identifying the term surveillance means different things to 
different HLS professionals. An example would be the cop versus public health worker. 
Cops believe surveillance is the covert act of watching a place or person to gather 
information for further review in an ongoing criminal case or the electronic tracking of a 
suspect’s movement or other similar versions. In the public health world, surveillance is 
thought as either passive or active surveillance.105  Passive surveillance could be the 
digital tracking of medical cases reported, over the counter non-prescription drugs sold in 
105  Ruth L. Berkelman et al., “Public Health Surveillance.” Oxford Textbook of Public Health, 
Volume 2: The Methods of Public Health, no. 5 (2009), 699–715.  
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a region to determine potential flu or other information collected that gives an epidemic 
or pandemic warning. Active surveillance in public health then becomes asking for and 
getting lab results, doctor diagnosis reports or case definition filtering (If you have 
symptoms 1, 2, 3 then you got Disease A.) The doctrine would require some definitions 
and also allow for broader scoping as needed or concentration of scope as needed. The 
doctrine could identify a broad definition of surveillance and allow for a more detailed 
version in a strategy to define the types and breadth of surveillance and the meanings of 
each within each discipline. Lack of public transparency, trust and involvement could 
make people think the local health department is now doing homeland security intrusive 
surveillance when they are really just trying to prepare for a pandemic flu. Establishing 
macro definitions and scoping them down to specific strategy and policies, would give 
each discipline an opportunity to explain their individual definitions, as well as allowing 
the public the ability to feel more at ease. 
The intelligence doctrine should be listed in the states homeland security initiative 
and not specifically in a fusion center or state police entity. Cooperation among 
stakeholders would mean a doctrine level document should be at the highest level of 
influence usually by the governor’s office. This guiding principal doctrine would allow 
strategy development, as well as public review in order to gain further compliance or gain 
better insight into the methodology and reasoning behind the concept we call homeland 
security. 
Currently, the term homeland security is still not well defined,106 there is little 
more than ad-hoc policy directives or grant requirements, and there is a public distrust on 
what is the mission of the intelligence community versus law enforcement versus 
emergency management. Privacy policy statements appear in some publications and not 
in others, there is little guidance on the privacy of information held and how it is to be 
106  Christopher Bellavita and Ellen M. Gordon, “Changing Homeland Security: Teaching the Core,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 1 (2006). http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.1.1.  
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used.107  The NSA Prism project is an example of a debate in FISA court authorizations 
and what exactly is meta-data and how is it to be used in a conspiracy investigation. 
C. BLENDING 
Looking at the military and federal government’s doctrines, the U.K.’s domestic 
doctrine’ specifically to counter terror and LE methods in the U.S., a pattern of gaps has 
begun to emerge. 
Though U.S. LE efforts have reduced major crime in many jurisdictions, the 
intelligence collection in the U.S. is still predominantly a state and federal aspect that 
many local LE agencies do not participate in.108 The overall engagement from many 
local LE agencies (minus the largest Major City Initiatives such as New York, Los 
Angeles etc.) conducting dedicated intelligence gathering is low109. Wanting to have a 
nationalistic approach to problem solving at the lowest levels, as the IACP wants, will 
require greater participation in the collection, dissemination and re-evaluation of 
information these smaller agencies have. The gap appears to be tied with a perception of 
funding, manpower, understanding of tradecraft, and overall buy-in to crime reduction in 
the community of the respective agency. Looking at the U.K. model specifically, the 
Special Branches are dedicated positions and interactive with the federal version MI-5. 
States are particularly prepared to follow the U.K. model and establish special branches 
to bridge the gap between the U.S. federalist agencies doing intelligence collection (FBI 
and DHS) with the local LE partners. State police agencies are the primary fusion center 
operators, as well as having a long history of JTTF participation. State police agencies 
also currently have the greatest geographic footprint outside the federal government with 
jurisdictional issue minimized. The missing piece for state police domestic intelligence 
107  Global Intelligence Working Group, “National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan,” U.S. 
Department of Justice. 2011.  
108  Carter and Carter, Intelligence-Led Policing Conceptual and Functional Considerations for Public 
Policy: 310–-325.  
109  D. L. Carter, “The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 74, 
no. 6 (2005). 
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collection is a codified doctrine in line with federal definitions and philosophy while still 
grounded in local issues.  
The IACP in coordination with the DOJ-BJA published a report on the “New 
Intelligence Architecture” in which they have framed an analytical capability for law 
enforcement units. In it they have established levels of intelligence operations from Level 
1-4. In the Level 1 operational units, agencies “produce tactical and strategic intelligence 
products that benefit their own department as well as other law enforcement 
agencies…they employ an intelligence manager, intelligence officers, and professional 
intelligence analysts.”110  Many state police agencies are also on track to be established 
as Level I Intelligence agencies over many police departments across the U.S. based on 
size, scope and full time employees dedicated to criminal intelligence analysis versus 
specific crime analysis as is the case with most municipal police agencies or smaller 
agencies at any level. 
Having a doctrine like CONTEST, that is accepted by all stakeholders, and 
implemented by state police agencies, is at least a chance at getting bridges over the 
many failed streams of communication between the federal government IC and U.S. 
based LE to counter the terroristic threat. Having a large footprint of community-
involved states ensuring the protections of people begins the transparency needed to have 
a populace feel as if they are safe as well as protected on the liberty front. The state 
police agencies in most states are well respected and have been very much integrated in 
federal taskforces for long periods of time. Allowing cleared state police special branch 
intelligence agents, working with local LE agencies, having access to classified federal 
information and then turning it into actionable local intelligence, gives the U.S. a better 
feel for local terrorism threats, functions and interdictions. 
Using a doctrine to blend the smart aspects of community oriented police 
strategies of community involvement, with problem oriented police strategies of getting 
to the root problems of the crime triangle, and the interaction of intelligence-led policing 
110  Marilyn B. Peterson, New Realities: The New Intelligence Architecture. Intelligence-Led Policing 
(U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005).  
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with human intelligence, requires some level of commitment from an agency to fully 
embrace. The doctrine would allow for specific aspects that are the highlights of each 
method to shine forward based on a states particular need. Some states may need a 
heavier influence of community policing if there was or is a history of past abuse. Getting 
the cops on the street to interact with local communities, especially ethnic minority 
communities, begins to break the ice and hopefully begins a trust in order for citizens to 
feel they can bring tips or information to the police as needed. Some states may need a 
more problem oriented policing doctrine to fully get communities to understand the 
problems at the root of the cause. The problem-oriented doctrine would show, as 
CONTEST does, that prevention through some investment could reduce the interaction of 
the crime triangle and prevent or mitigate the results of an interaction. 
Federal agencies as well as state agencies could have mutual doctrines with an 
overlap for a joint operation such as the DoD does in its joint publications listed. The 
DoD model shows us how a doctrine gives subordinate commands a guide but not 
specific directives and allows for discretion at all levels. Current in-fighting and turf wars 
in the federal IC, as well as between federal LE agencies, are well documented. The not 
so well-documented cases are between federal and state LE as competition for case 
prosecution is no different then competition for money in the IC based on intelligence 
reporting output measures. Joint doctrine on operations is on a minor scale handled 
through some type of memorandum of understanding or some other type of document, 
with the basis primarily being that of asset sharing and covering of expenses. A DoD 
model in which both federal and state LE agencies establish a section on joint operations 
with intelligence sharing and inter-operability guidance, would go a long way in creating 
a cultural shift from hoarding to sharing. Doctrine could spell out those nuances that are 
often brought up, such as clearances, storage and sharing agreements and other sticking 
issues that seem to be a common place of concern.  
Utilizing a hybrid approach of smart practices across domains could lay a 
roadmap to some success in getting the first major bridge built. Working with diverse 
sections of homeland security professionals, learning from multiple perspectives, and 
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establishing basic principals, are basic tenants of communication and social networking 
for problem solving and crowd sourcing. Without opening our lenses to a broader field of 
view with an open mind on courses of actions, we begin to fall into the very dogmatic 
groupthink that created words like “silo, internal only, not for others, competition, Intel 
stagnation.” Having courage to set a philosophy, set guidance, set ethos, and establish 
ethical priorities is doctrine 101. 
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V. NOW WHAT? 
Doctrine is in many aspects of institutions and seems to have merit in bringing 
together individuals in large organizations to create or change a culture.  
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Establishing statewide doctrine would cause a ripple effect in most strategies and 
methodology, as well as micro-policy as the defining guide would change some 
approaches to problem solving. These changes would be different for every agency 
depending upon culture, leadership and severity of any shifts in operational directive or 
cultural shift of operational management. Some leading questions to be addressed need to 
be reviewed and crowd sourced in order to get a feel for the level of knowledge, 
commitment and buy in from agencies. In this section, questions that may be asked will 
be addressed with a pragmatic recommendation. It is recognized that through crowd 
sourcing and meaningful discourse, other options could be developed. 
Who should develop THE doctrine? All agencies could develop a basic doctrine 
for their agencies. Most guides currently being published, such as those from DOJ-BJA, 
seek to get all agencies regardless of size to participate in the Nation Sharing Plan. 
Developing a basic doctrine is imperative in the face of shifting priorities for local 
manpower. Having a range of doctrines to codify into a larger document can assist with 
local perceptions and allow further discussions and clarifications in terms of definitions 
and other context.  The state level doctrines foundational basis could be based on  
national strategies as written by the BJA, IACP and other committees, as well as local 
perspectives, while preserving the fundamental requirement of protecting civil rights. 
Who could tackle this issue and bring people to the table? State police agencies 
are poised to be able to establish a committee to draft a doctrine and conduct regional or 
singular located project management style building of the basic foundation. Having a 
centralized repository for local agencies to submit ideas, suggestions, and develop 
SMART (Specific-Measurable-Attainable-Relevant-Time Bound) practices and drafts 
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should be examined.  The state fusion centers have already established much of the 
groundwork needed to bring all levels to a table.  Having a regional command across 
each state, can bridge outreach and establish regional meetings important for that regional 
consortium of partners and develop those relationships in each region of a state. 
Should we make every agency in a state participate in a sharing environment? 
Compelling an agency to participate is unlikely to produce positive results. Developing 
good products with all local concerns addressed should bring those agencies not 
participating into the group. Leadership by example tends to bring people together versus 
having micro-dictatorships.  Incentives to participation would be gained from the rapid 
exchange of information, trusted relationships, security of information and intelligence, 
common operating platforms and pictures, equal partnerships based on legal, ethical, 
philosophical foundations. As legal matters continue to be brought up in formal meetings 
and especially in the public forum, the State Attorney General’s office would be best 
suited to have oversight for legal matters effecting an intelligence doctrine philosophy. 
The local district attorney would guide actual policy and procedures of each department 
based upon methods of implementation in those jurisdictions. 
What if we want to change a doctrine or update it? As doctrine is descriptive and 
not directive, there will be no penalty or recourse for shifting doctrine. This continues the 
debate that intelligence can drive policy as well as policy can drive intelligence. There 
would be an advantage of allowing continuous reviews of policy as well as tradecraft to 
make sure the basic tenants of intelligence collection ethics are upheld. 
B. QUESTIONS AND ISSUES REMAINING 
Should the IACP or other another national group take the lead?  The IACP, as 
well as the Major City Chiefs association, have been at the forefront of this initiative. The 
states should decide how and when to present their ideas or working documents as 
needed. Established groups as previously stated have a working knowledge very few 
agencies have and should be directed to participate in the larger intelligence summits help 
by the IACP et al. Would a national group take away from the ground up prospect of 
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forming doctrine locally?  The national groups are direct representatives of the local 
police and state police agencies and should not impede a grass roots national approach. 
Does doctrine always lead to dogma?  How can doctrine stay pragmatic and are 
there additional resources to make sure it does?  Having strategy and methodology, as 
well as policies being circular and cyclic; the doctrine will never stop innovation of 
strategy, methodology or policy refinement. Dogmatic doctrine usually has no review 
process, is directive versus descriptive, and usually set by religion or other institutions.  
In-line, yearly, peer, academic and other reviews would keep doctrine pragmatic, creative 
as well as innovative.  
Does doctrine drive policy or policy drive doctrine? Do we establish doctrine 
before strategy, methods or policy?  The debate on what comes first is important in the 
ad-hoc nature of LE operations; LE tends to do a little in each category of policy, strategy 
and methodology but not quite enough in specific areas of doctrine. The guiding 
definitional philosophy merely gets everyone more center and in-line. Using policy, 
methods and working strategy actually helps develop doctrine as the history and strides 
we have made in professional policing are not thrown out. The basic tenant is to get more 
people on board and in line with a common platform to work off. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Doctrine is a very hard topic to define and further research on LE and IC strategy 
and methodology would benefit the discourse to determine where or how doctrine would 
fit in on operational aspects of LE and IC implementation. Using additional genres and 
fields of study in academia to conduct comparative analysis would also give practitioners 
as well as academia, an ability to fuse strategies and allow better innovation of existing 
policies, methods and strategies. Some questions that need further specific research are: 
1. What are the historical trends analyses of doctrines ability to bridge gaps 
in an organization or institution? 
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2. Do business models allow for a doctrine approach as a basis for a model of 
excellence; or does creativity and innovation with loose controls have a 
place in domestic intelligence to deter stagnation? 
3. How would nationalistic bottom up solutions affect the status of the 
federalist intelligence community? 
D. CONCLUSION 
Doctrine has merits in some institutions and in others there may be debate on the 
effectiveness of detailed doctrine (dogma-v-innovation). The research presented showed 
that foreign strategy, current LE strategy, as well as military strategy, all have common 
threads to be successful. Those threads are built upon a foundation that can be trusted, 
transparent, and sound. A government by the people for the people should not be against 
the people. The people however trust that their government knows how to handle tough 
situations, as well as how to handle the constitutionally protected rights we were founded 
upon. Policies, methods and strategies should always be shifting based upon educated and 
processed informational decisions by leadership of this country all the way down to the 
local first responder on the watch. Doctrinal philosophy of doing what is right when no 
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